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Summary  findings
After evaluating the Uruguay Round's impact on  high point. In most OECD countries, this was worsened
agriculture and border protection in the next decade,  by "dirty tariffication:"  the new base tariffs offered even
Ingco concludes that while there was significant reform  greater protection than the nontariff barriers they
of the rules - particularly the conversion of nontariff  replaced. Even after the commitments to tariff reductions
barriers into tariffs and the reduction and binding of all  in the Round, the ad valorem measure of the final
tariffs - in practice, trade will probably be liberalized  binding tariffs will remain higher than the average rate of
less than expected.  protection in 1982-93.
The objective of the Round was to reverse  A number of developing countries in East Asia, Latin
protectionism and remove trade distortions. This may  America, and the Middle East chose to lhck in previous
not be achieved in practice, at least not until further  liberalization efforts on some products. But for m7ost
reductions are carried out in future rounds of  commnodities,  there will be little actual liberalizatioln,
negotiations. The major exception to this conclusion is in  since most developing countries chost to bind their
high-income Asian countries, where protection for major  tariffs at a maximum level.
commodities will be significantly reduced.  Fven whien countries reduced alreadv-hound rates,
The tariffication and binding of all tariffs on  bound tariffs remained signiticantly higher than current
agricultural products  represents a significant step  applied rates, giving countries the flexibilitN  to raise
forward. Liberalization is implicit because countries are  tariffs later.
prohibited from arbitrarily raising tariffs to higher new  The high level of bound tariffs may allow countries to
levels. But many of the newly established tariffs are so  apply variable tariffs below the bound level, thus failing
high in many countries as to effectively prohibit trade.  to stabilize tariffs and improve market access.
Patterns of liberalization vary considerably by  Moreover, the Round did not touch  nilaiiv  of the worst
commodit,y and by country. Generally, the extent  of  distortions  in developing Lountries, such as import
liberalization was diminished by binding tariffs to the  subsidies, export taxes, state-trading moniopolies, and
base period of 1986-88,  when border  protection was at a  domestic policies that implicitly tax agriculture.
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Abstract
The substantial  reform  in the rules governing  agricultural  trade including  the introduction
of tariff bindings  which  set an upper bound  on future  protection,  is a major step forward  which  can
be credited  to the Uruguay  Round  agreement. However,  the extent of intended  liberalization  was
eroded because the tariff equivalents  in major OECD countries  were set at levels significantly
higher  than the border  protection  they  replaced  in the base period. Even  after the tariff reductions
scheduled  in the Round,  the ad-valorem  tariff bindings  in major commodities  in several  countries
will  remain h  igher than the rate of protection  during 1982-93. This results in levels  of protection
potentially higher than historical levels.  In developing  countries, the reductions in  border
protection  will also be  modest at best, since most countries chose to bind their tariffs at a
maximum  level or to reduce  already  bound  rates, which  nevertheless  remained  higher  than current
applied  rates. The most prevalent  pre-UR  border measures  in developing  countries  (export  taxes
and import  subsidies)  are  not disciplined  in the GATT.
1.  Introduction
The conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round was a historic  breakthrough. After nearly eight
years of arduous  negotiations,  new international  rules were agreed  to govern  trade in agriculture,
manufacturing,  services,  and intellectual  property. In agriculture,  which had effectively  escaped
GATT  disciplines  for decades,  new  international  rules were established  and constraints  imposed  on
border protection,  export  subsidies  and domestic  support. Among  the most important  rule changes
were tariflication,  binding  of all tariffs,' minimum  access  commitments  in products  where imports
were previously  banned  or restricted,  prevention  of new export  subsidies  and bindings  on the value
and volumes  of existing  export  subsidies.
'The commitment  to the  maximum  tariff that can be applied  at the border. This  means  that countries  can apply  tariffs
at or below the bound  maximum,  but not to raise tariffs  above  that,  unless  it is renegotiated  in GATT  and
comnpenisationi  given to affected  trading  partners.Tariffication--conversion  of  non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  to  bound  tariffs--moves
agricultural trade towards the same treatment as manufactures within the GATT.  As a tirst step
towards  liberalization, participating countries, with the exception of those covered by  "special
treatment"  provisions (explained below), were required to convert  their non-tarif'f measures to
bound tariffs.  While the concept is not without pitfalls as discussed in the literature. 3 tariffication
provides the immediate benefit of achieving transparency ot' import protection.  In addition, tariffs
are  generally  preferred  over  othier import  barriers  since  tlhey are  more  predictable,  non-
discrimiinatory  and easier to bind or reduce and less susceptible to corruption.  They also facilitate
competition in internal markets and help ensure trade adjustments by importing countries to world
market changes.  Moreover, even though tariflication does not deal directly witli export policies, it
could provide indirect control on export subsidies.  Exporting countries providing export subsidies
have to maintain impcrt barriers to avoid re-importing the goods exported.  Arbitrage in tihe  market
implies that in general a country cannot set an export subsidy higher than the level ol't he laril'  plus
transport  costs.  Hence,  tarillication  l'acilitates  an  indirect  control on  lIhe amount  of  export
subsidies implied by removing the non-tariff barriers to reimporfing.
But  how much trade  liberalization will actually  be achieved 1rom the  UR agreement'?
Recent  studies  (IATRC.  1994: GATT,  1994) have  provided broad  evaluations  ol' the  final
Agreement, but to date, no systematic comparison ol pre- and post-UR border protection has been
made on a wide range ol' agricultural commodities and countries.  Most countries, particularly in
OECD,  converted their NTBs into specilic tariffs,  preventing an easy assessment of' protection
rates.  The paper estimates post-UR ad-valoreni tari'f' equivalents ol'  order measures based on  hlie
2This includes quantitative  import  restrictions,  variabie levies, minimuin  import prices, discretionary  import
licensing,  non-tariff  measures maintained  through state trading enterprises, voluntary  export restrainits and all  similar
measures.
3See Deardorff and Stern (]984) and Baldwin (1988).
2detailed results  of final concessions on tariffication  and export subsidy commitments on  major
commodities.
The extent of agricultural trade  liberalization as a  result of the Round is evaluated by
comparing post-UR protection measures with historical estimates and a hypothesized future rate of
protection  without  the  UR  agreement.  Participating  countries  subject  to  tariffication  were
required to apply the UR Modalities (Annex 3) in establishing their initial base tariffs -- the tariffs
to  be applied in the first  year of the implementation of the Agreement -- based  on prices  and
protection levels prevailing in the base period, 1986-88.  That is, the height of the tariffs in 1995
should be equal  to the actual  level of  nomninal  protection received in  1986-88.  A  significant
difference between these two measures could be considered a form of "dirty" tariffication: this is
6
also evaluated in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized into 8 sections.  Section 2 gives a  summary of
what was achieved in the area of market access, export subsidies and domestic support.  Section 3
describes  the methods used in estimating pre-  and post-UR border protection.  The results  of
tariffication  and the clhanges  in border protection before and after and the UR are discussed in
sections 4 and 5.  Estimates of trade liberalization are discussed in section 6.  The implications for
selected commodities and concluding comments are discussed in section 7 and 8, respectively.
4The concessions are basedl  on the published Schedules appended to the Final Act.  There are also bilateral
arrangements which were not in the country Schedules.  These side agreements  are considered in the case of grains
for the EU and the United States and  for beef and veal between the United States and Japan, and between the United
States andl the Republic of Korea.
5This approach overlooks the reductions in expected protection rates brought about by the introduction of bindings
above current rates, hut overstates the marginal reduction in protection due to bindings which reduce protection
below  historical levels (Martin and Francois, 1994). The effects of the tariff bindings on expected protection will be
investigated in further analysis.
6 Josling, et. al., (1994) had brietly mentioned the way countries took advantage of tariffication to raise the level of
their tariff bindings.
32.  What was Achieved in Market Access, Export Subsidies and Domestic Support?
2.1  Tariffication
The most significant aspect of the UR agreement on agriculture was a chiange in the rules
regarding market access.  Participants  have agreed, except in cases of "special treatment."  to
convert non-tariff barriers into bound duties and not to introduce new non-tarilf measures (Article
4 of the Agreement). The new bound tariffs, as well as tariffs which had been bound in previous
negotiations, have to be reduced by at least 15 percent and by 36 percent. on a simple (unweighted)
average over  six years in industrial countries (1995-2000), and  by at  least  It) percent and  24
percent on a simple (unweighted) average over ten years in developing countries (1  995-20()4).
In line with the  "special and  differential" treatment given to  developing countries, the
following provisions  apply to  the  latter:  (i) in commodities subject to  unbound larilffs at  the
beginning of the Round, tarift ceiling bindings were allowed, and (ii) the least-developed countries
were given the  flexibility to  make  a  ceiling  binding oller  in agriculture  in  lieu  ol  reduction
commitments.
The agreed levels ol  tarilfs  were determined by  the country oilers,  as expressed in the
tariff Schedules appended to the agreement. The methods intended to be used in the establishilment
of  these  commitments  were  outlined in  a  negotiating document  entitled  "Modalities  for  ithe
Establishment of Specitic Binding Commitments under the Relorm Programine (reierred to below
as the Modalities)."  Since the Schedules ot commitments have now been mutually accepted and
torm  part  of  the  Final  Agreement, however,  the  Modalities have  lost  their  power.  The
7Special  treatment was allowed  on cominodities which  Inet  the followinig  condlitiois:  (i) commodities  that  are major
staples in the (liet. (ii)  imports are less than 3 percent of domestic consumption  in the hase perio(l. and (iii)  no export
subsidies have been providel.  In return  minimum  acccss levels were required to he itro(luce(d  t 4 pe  rcent  of'
dome.stic consumption  rising  to X percent over the impleimentation periodl ol  lthe  Roud(l.  The principal  cases  ol
special treatment were rice  imports in  Japan.  the Repuhlic  ol Korea. and the Philippines.
4implementation of the Agreement is therefore determined by the final concessions made by  each
participating country.
The  Modalities provide  a  range  of  alternatives in  establishing the  tariff  equivalents
depending on the level of development of the participating country and the nature of the tariff and
import restrictions at the beginning of the Round.  That is, whether or not the tariff was already
bound at the beginning of the Round and/or whether NTBs were applied.  For commodities subject
to bound tariffs at the beginning of the Round, participating countries were required to either (i)
apply tariffication if NTBs existed, or (ii) establish the base tariffs at the current bound rate.  In
commodities subject only to unbound duties (i.e., no NTBs apply) at the beginning of the Round,
participating countries were required to set their 1995 base tariffs and apply tariff reductions based
on the level in September, 1986.  If unbound duties and NTBs existed at the beginning of the
Round,  tariffication  was required  (discussed below).  Developing countries  were  allowed  to
establish tariff ceiling binding in commodities subject to unbound tariffs.
A binding defines the maximum tariff that  can be applied at  the border.  If a  tariff  is
bound, say at 40 percent, any duty at the border greater than 40 percent is prohibited, whether it is
a tax levied by the government or a "mark-up" charged by a state trading enterprise (STEs).  STEs
are not in conflict with the Agreement; however, NTBs maintained by STEs  were required to be
converted into tariffis by  either  applying (i) tariffication,  (ii) a  ceiling binding or  (iii) special
treatment.  Under the  Agreement, STEs  or  any  import monopoly must  not provide  domestic
protection in excess of the tariff bindings.
The tariffication of NTBs and the establishment of bindings on newly tariffied protection
and existing tariffs will change the way governments can manage agricultural imports.  Before the
UR, bound tariffs in developed countries covered about 58 percent of all tariff lines and about 80
percent of the total value of agricultural imports.  The UR concessions resulted in an increase in
5the share of tariff bindings to almost 100 percent of the value of imports in the industrial countries.
In developing countries and transition economies, the share of tariff bindings increased from  18
percent to 100 percent and will result in bound tariffs on 100 percent of their agricultural imports
(GATT Secretariat, 1994).  Hence, virtually all future trade in agriculture will be conducted under
bound tariffs.  Depending on the resulting level of bindings and tariffied protection, as well as the
conditions under which the Special Safeguards and additional duties can be invoked (see below).
this represents a significant step toward increased predictability and stability of trade barriers.
The effectiveness of tariffication is, however, reduced if the tariff bindings are set at very
highi levels, whiclh would  allow post-UR applied rates  to  remain prohibitive and  could permit
substantial variations in the range below the bound level.  Countries can charge tariffs at varying
levels within the margin of the binding, which could be linked to an internal price.  The duty can be
set as the difference of the given domestic price and the world price as long as the tariff charged
does not exceed the binding.  In practice, this could work similarly to a variable levy or a minimum
price, despite the fact that the agreement states that variable levies, minimum import prices,  etc.
are lorbidden and should be converted to tarift's (Article 4, paragraplh  2) and that the Agreement in
Customs Valuation generally prohibits the use of minimum prices.
The market access provisions did not result in "unconditional"  tariffication in all cases.  A
Special Treatment clause is provided (Annex 5) which, under specific conditions, allows certain
countries to delaly  taril'tication ol' their rice markets lor several years (e.g. Japan, the Republic of
Korea and the Philippines).  Safeguard Provisions were also included (Article 5) lor importers in
(he cases of' imiport surges and/or low world prices.  Hence, in addition to the  new tariffs  in
co  (iitiodiies  subiect  to  laril'lication. additional duties can be clharged  if eitler imports  increase
ahove a speciliedi  base level. or border prices For imiports  decline below specilied trigger prices.  It'
imports exceed a certain percentage ofl  the preceding three-year average. called the trigger level, or
6import  prices  decline below  a  trigger price,  additional  duties (up  to  one-third of  the  normal
applicable duty) could be imposed.  The trigger levels are relatively low and could be invoked
without requiring proof of injury.  It is difficult to assess the likely frequency and impact of the
special safeguards, but they are a likely source of additional protection.
Exporting countries obtained so-called  "minimum access commitments" in commodities
subject to tariffication. For developed countries, the minimum access was established at 3 percent
of  1986-88 consumption levels., increasing to 5 percent in 2000.  For developing countries. the
levels are set at  2 percent in the base period, rising to 4  percent in 2004.  However, with few
exceptions, most developing countries did not apply tariffication for most products and as a result
did not commit minimum or current access provisions.  If current imports are above thle levels
required in the minimum access, current levels are to be maintained (Modalities, paragraplh 5 and
Annex 3).  Imports under the minimum access provision are, however. not guaranteed.  They are
merely encouraged by receiving a reduced tariff (maximum of about 32 percent of the bound tariff
rate) on  "in-quota" imports.  In cases where exporters enjoyed preferential market access in the
past  or  previously had voluntary export restraint  agreements, their access opportunities were
maintained under a "current access" provision (Modalities, paragraph 6 and Annex 3).
In some countries, previous trade arrangements under the old quota systems were allowed
to count as meeting the minimum access requirements.  For example, the US sugar import quota
system was included by  applying a new tariff quota system to  the same quota  Irom the same
countries.  In the same way, the US Meat Import Law was translated into a tariff quota system
with the quotas given to the same countries which held previous quota rights (e.g. Australia and
RThe trigger level on quantities is dlefined as 115 percent of hase period imports for commodities where imports are
more than 30 percent of domestic consumption; at 110 percent of base imports where imports are between 10 percent
and 30 percent of consumption; and at 125 percent if imports account for less than 10 percent of domestic sales.  The
trigger level is ad justed by the change in domestic consumption hetween the two most recent years. but cannot he
below 105 percent of the preceding three-year average of im,ports.
7New Zealand).  In these cases, the minimum access provisions of the UR agreement will not open
markets significantly and will provide very little trade expansion beyond previous or current levels.
Even in other commodities, an evaluation of the minimum access commitments for major importing
countries relative to their recent import levels indicate that the additional trade likely to occur as a
result of the mninimum  access provisions will be very small relative to current world trade  levels.
The only major exception is  in rice, where the minimum access commitment of Japan  and the
Republic of Korea will result in increased trade of about I million tons annually, nearly 7 percent
of 1991/92 world trade.  Finally, ot course, the need for quota allocations brings back the non-
transparency of import protection.
2.2  Export  Subsidies
Anothier  relorin in the rules is in the area of export subsidies.  These changes are important
because export subsidies have been the major mecihanism  of protection in exporting countries.  The
long history of' high protection and support  in the industrial countries has been associated with
surplus production, a substantial part of whicil is sold on world markets at subsidized prices.  The
pre-UR  policy  regimne  provided no  effective contraint on  the  volume  of  subsidized  exports,
resulting in uncertainty in export markets for other producers and constraining the expansion of
comiipetitive  tra(de.  The  share ol' world exports  whicih was  covered by  export  subsidies was
signilicant  for  malor  a2ricultural  commodities. particularly  in  grains.  livestock products,  and
sugar.  In 1996-90. thie  European Union subsidized more tilan 95 percent ot its exports ol whieat
and butter. more than 9t) perceint  ol' cieese exports. 40 percent of its sugar exports. andi  more than
30 percent of its milk pow(ler exports.  US subsidized exports were largest in butter (94 percent),
wlheat (55 percent). non-f'at  dry milk (40)  percent) and cheese (23 percent).  The EU has been the
miain  user ot export subsi(dies  until tile late 1  980s when the US and other countries also started the
8significant use  of export subsidies to  win market shares.  The UR  agreement marks the  first
effective discipline on agricultural export subsidies since the founding of GATT.
The new rules on export subsidies under the Round, while important, were not as sweeping
as those for non-tariff barriers, in that the Round did not outlaw export subsidies but only imposed
limits on their application.  Participating countries accepted binding commitments on maximum
export subsidization (Article 3), leading to an agreed reduction in expenditure on export subsidies
(industrial countries by 36 percent and developing countries by 24 percent) as well as a reduction
in the quantity of subsidized exports ( industrial countries by 21 percent and developing countrics
by  14 percent)  over the implementation period.  The agreement also requires countries not to
extend export subsidies to commodities which were not subsidized in the base period.  The results
of these commitments for selected commodities in major countries are shown in Table  I  a  and Ib.
As shown, export subsidies are allowed up  to certain levels instead of being explicitly illegal as
they are for nonagricultural products.
The impact of the export subsidy reductions will depend on the quantity ol' the commodities
affected, the share of subsidized exports to total trade, and the policy adjustments made by major
countries during the implementation period.  An analysis of the final commitments indicates thal
the UR bindings on volumes and outlays will probably have a significalnt  efl'ect on trade 1lows and
prices.  Tables la  and  lb show that the share of world trade directly covered by export subsidies
was significant for many agricultural commodities. Since most developing countries impose a tax
on most ol' their agricultural exports, there are relatively few developing countries with export
subsidy commitments, namely Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Poland and Venezuela.
To determine the relative importance of the constraint on volume ol' export subsidies, we
can calculate the quantity of' exports that  will not be subsidized (21 percent ol' the volume ol'
eSix  years for industrial countries  ancd  ten years  for developing  countries.
9subsidized  exports in the base period) as a share of world trade.  As a share of world trade in
1989-93,  the decline  in the volume  of subsidized  exports would  be most significant  in wheat and
wheat products  (15.4 percent),  dairy products such as milk powder  (20 percent) and butter (17.5
percent),  and in meat markets,  particularly  poultry (9.3 percent)  and beef and veal (8.8 percent).
In contrast,  the reductions  in the volume  of subsidized  exports in sugar, oilseeds  and vegetable  oils,
and other meats represent a very small share of world trade, and hence would not likely have a
significant  impact  on world  markets  in these  products.
While the reductions  are significant  in the most subsidized  products,  the allowable  volume
of export subsidies for major commodities  at the end of the implementation  period will remain
substantial, with the largest amounts  remaining  in wheat (over 40 million  tons), coarse grains
(nearly 20 million  tons), beef and veal (over l million  tons), and vegetable  oils (about I million
tons).  While the reforrns undoubtedly  represent an  improvement  over previous levels, the
rcmaining  subsidies  still  represent  a substantial  distortion  in world  agricultural  trade.
10Table  la.  Base  and Final Subsidy Conuniiitents  for
Selecred  Coimiodities  in Major Subsidizing Countries
000  iitetic tons
Country  Wheat
Stibsidized  Exports
1986-90  1995  2000
US  18,382.4  20,238.3  14,522.1
EU  17,008.1  19,118.6  13,436.4
Canada  11,204.8  13,590.3  8,851.8
Turkey  2,306.0  2,600.2  1,461.2
Hungary  1,444.0  1,393.0  1,141.0
Total (top 5)  50,345.3  56,940.3  39,412.4
Total  Export Sibsidies  53,018.3
World Trade 1991/92  108,289.0
Top S as % of Total Export Subsidies  95.0
Top S as % of World  Trade in 1991/92  46.5
Country  Rice
Subsidized Exports
1986-90  1995  2000
Indonesia  299.8  295.6  257.8
EU  183.7  177.3  145.1
Uruguay  53.2  45.7
US  48.8  271.7  38.6
Colotiubia  18.9  16.3
Total (topS)  604A  744.5  503.4
Total  I/  604.5
World Trade  14,080.0
Top S as  % of Total Export Subsidies  100.0
Top S as b ofWorld  Trade in 1991/92  4.3
Country  Vegetable Oil
Subsidized  Exports
1986-90  1995  2000
Brazil  552.1  544.3  474.7
Hungary  185.0  179.0  146.0
uS  178.9  5875  141.3
Canada  117.4  113.3  92.8
Turkey  72.2  94.5  76.5
Total (top5)  1,105.6  1,518.7  931.3
Total  I/  1,197.2
World Trade  21,470.0
Top 5 as  % of Total Export Subsidies  92.4
Top 5 as  *  of World Trade in  1991/92  5.1
Country  Coarse  Grains
Subsidized Exports
1986-90  1995  2000
Eli  12,624.5  12.182.6  9,973.4
Canada  4,392.0  4,418.9  3,617.6
Mexico  1/  3,577.8  3,513.1  2,951.0
ITS  1,975.4  1,906.3  1,560.6
Rep. of South  Africa  2/  1,893.5  1,827.3  1,495.9
Total (topS)  24,463.2  23,848.2  19,598.5
Total l/  28,328.6
World Trade  91,680.0
Top S as % of Toral Export Subsidies  86.4
Top 5 as  % of World Trade in 1991/92  26.7
1/ Cors and sorghum Subsidy  volumes have been added
2/ Barley, mianize  and simaize  products,  oats, and grain sorghuni  subsidy
voluittes have been  added  together
Soturce:  Author's  calculations: basic data are from Uruguay  Round country schedules.
11Table lb.  Base and Final Subsidy  Commnitments  for
Selected Commodities  in Major Subsidizing  Countries
000 metric  tons
Beef & Veal
Subsidized Exports
Country  1986-90  1995  2000
EU  1,034.3  1,118.7  817.1
Brazil  106.7  105.2  91.779
Austria  X0.9  90.1  63.882
Poland 1/  51.7  49.9  40.9
Hungary  36.0  35.0  28
Total (tops)  1,309.6  1,398.9  1,041.7
Total 2/  1,372.4
Top 5 ms  %  of Total Export Subsidies  95.4
Pigmeat
Subsidized Exports
Country  1986-90  1995  2000
EU  508.6  490.8  401.8
Hungary  115  111  91
Poland 1/  51.7  49.9  40.9
Sweden  47  45.1  37.1
linland  8.1  11.3  6.4
Total  (tops)  730.4  708.4  577.2
'otold  2/  741.0
World Trade  2,441.0
Tol)  5 as % of Total Export Subsidies  98.6
Top  5 as % of World Trate  in 1991/92  29.9
Polltry
Subsiidizeed  Exports
('ountry  1986-90  1995  2000
Il:  367.S0  440.10  290.60
li  iigary  141.00  136.00  111.00
l3ra7il  97.94  96.57  84.23
IIS  35.44  34.20  27.99
Poland  16.40  15.80  13.10
.To:j (top5)  65S 57  722.66  526.92
T'otal  2/  663.68
Worl lI'raile  2074.00
1'1) 5 as '..  of'T'otal  I  'xlxrt Subsidies  0.99
'op 5 as % oil'  Worldl  l'ritde  in I  99)  I  /92  31.75
1/ Tlhe  volume  of exlxwt  subsidy for  l'oland  includes  all meats  except for poultry
2/ Total  E'xpkort  Subsidies
Scource:  Author's  calculation.s:  hasic data are  from l 'nastsy  Roundl  country scheduLles.
122.3  Domestic  Support
The third area of reform  was the binding  of domestic  support  levels. The proposal in the Dunkel
package to reduce  support on a commodity  basis was not agreed  in the Round. Instead,  the new
rules and bindings were established  on the level of total domestic  agricultural support, called
Aggregate  Measure of Support (AMS) which includes border price support through tariff and
export subsidies  discussed  above (Annex  3, paragraph 8).  Based on fixed external  prices in the
base period (1986-88), the agreement specifies the determination  of  the AMS and requires
countries  to reduce their total AMS by 20 percent over the implementation  period. For several
reasons, these concessions  on domestic  support reductions  are considerably  less effective  than
those of border measures. First, the constraint  on aggregate,  rather than commodity  specific,
support leaves  much  scope for continued  support  policies  and domestic  policy action on particular
commodities. The lack of discipline  over individual  commodity  policies will also likely lead to
increasing  policy distortions  between  commodities. Second,  the "green box"  will allow many
policies to  continue unreduced in  participating  countries. Third, the two important support
measures,  the EU compensation  payments  and the US deficiency  payments  are exempted  from the
reduction commitments,  even though they are not fully production neutral.  Fourth, domestic
subsidies  with significant  production  impacts  play a relatively  limited  role in other  major  countries.
Last, the AMS calculations  are based on the outlays during 1986-88, which was a period of
relatively  low world prices  for agricultural  products  and.  therefore  high expenditures  on domestic
support to farmers. Because  of higher  world  prices  and recent  domestic  agricultural  policy  reforms
'° This includes  general services  involving  expenditures  which  provide  services  and do not involve  direct  payments
such as research,  pest and disease  control,  training,  extension,  marketing  and promotion,  and infrastructure  services.
These measures  shall not involve  price support  to farmers. In developing  countries,  government  measures  to promote
agricultural  and rural development  such as investment  subsidies,  input  subsidies  provided  to low income farmers
(cash  or kind) are exempted.
13in major countries, the new commitments may not involve any further real reductions in current
levels of domestic support.
3.  Estimates of Pre- and Post- UR Protection
How will the new UR rules and disciplines affect border protection in agriculture?  This
section outlines the methods used in estimating pre-  and  post-UR border protection measures.
Agricultural protection as a result of the Round will be disciplined primarily by the outcome of
tariffication and the reduction commitments on export subsidies and domestic support.  In general.
the  results  of final concessions on  tariffication  will affect  the post-UR  nominal protection on
imported goods, while the export subsidy commitments will define the rate ol' nominal protectioni
on  exportables.  In  cases  where exporting countries are  providing export  subsidies  and  also
maintaining import barriers  on homogenous goods. arbitrage implies that in gencral, a  country
cannot set an export subsidy higher than the level of' the tarif'f.  Hence, the level ot' the tarifl'
equivalent sets a ceiling on  the level of the export subsidy and would also be indicative of' the
maximum nominal protection rate.  To be consistent with the tarif'fication provisions.  I have used
a  measure equivalent to the  nominal rate  of protection.  This  measures thc  magnitude ol' Ihc
historical price distortion or price wedge induced by non-tarifl measures.  The post-UR ad-valoreni
tariff  equivalent of border protection is estimated based on the tarillication  and export subsidy
commitments.
3.1  Pre-UR Border Protection
Any evaluation of the liberalizing effect of the Round must begin with an assessment ol' the
protective effects of' the measures which preceded it and which wouldl  have occurred without it.
Had the  UR not concluded, presumably these policies, or some variant  of' them,  would have
14generated  the counterfactual  future rate of protection  against which the UR should be evaluated.
The protective  effects  of pre-UR  trade distortions  in a particular  market are measured  in terms of
their tariff equivalents.  The UR adopted  the price-gap  method  in establishing  the tariff equivalent
of non-tariff  barriers. Tlis method  assumes  that the difference  between  the domestic  price and the
world price is caused by the restrictive  effects of all non-tariff  barriers that are present in the
market. The UR tariffication  procedure  required  the establishment  of initial  base tariffs to afford
the same level  of nominal  protection  as the  prevailing  NTBs  in 1986-88. That is, the post-UR  base
tariff, to be set at either specific  or ad-valorem  rates, would  be based on the protected  domestic
and world  prices  of the relevant  commodity  in 1986-88. The  difference  between  these  prices would
be the "price gap" which defines  the specific  tariff and the percentage  difference  between  them
would  be the ad-valorem  tariff  equivalent  that would  replace  the non-tariff  barrier.
The exact measure  of a non-tariff  barrier in terms of its effect on prices is one which
compares  the domestic  price that would  prevail  without  the non-tariff  barrier with the price which
would prevail domestically  with the non-tariff  barrier, assuming  that the price paid to suppliers
remain  unchanged. However,  since  these  prices are usually  not observable,  the actual measure  of
non-tariff  barriers  are usually  based on a comparison  of domestic  and world  prices  in the presence
of non-taritf  barriers. To apply  this method,  it is required  to identify  the appropriate  prices. This
is dif'ficult  because  products of a particular  industry  that are imported  into a country are usually
not identical  to those that are produced  domestically,  and they may also differ from products that
arc produced  and traded abroad. In general,  the appropriate  prices to use in measuring  the price
impact  of a non-tariff  barrier are the domestic  and invoice  price of the imported  product. Since
available  domestic  prices do not usually distinguish  domestically  produced  goods from imported
goods,  the price of the  product  in the domestic  market  is used  instead.
15Let Pd represent the price of the product in the domestic market and Pwo  as the invoice
price of imports inclusive of tariffs and transport costs (c.i.f).  The price comparisons are usually
expressed as a percentage difference  between the prices expressed as follows: t  = IO()  [Pd - P(01/
Pw.  The  latter  is  referred  to  as  the  ad-valoreni tariff  equivalent or  the  implicit protection
associated with the non-tariff barrier.  The ad-valorem tariff equivalents of border protection are
estimated for each year depending on data availability -- from 1982-93 in developing countries and
from 1979-93 in OECD countries.
In the case of exportables, export subsidies can be used to raise the domestic producer
price above the world price.  They can be specified in the same way as taril'fs since an export
subsidy is merely a  negative export tax.  Export subsidies raise the price received by  domilestic
producers and paid by consumers as the domestic price is increased by arbitrage until it equals the
subsidy-inclusive price  on  sales.  The  ad-valorern  export  subsidy equivalenD  is expressed  as
follows: IV =  [(Pdi  - P(,)/Pw I * 1().
Data on world and domestic prices use were derived from several sources including the
Organization lor Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD), US Depart  ment of Agriculture
(USDA),  FAO,  and the World Bank.  These sources are complemented by the inf'ormation on
internal  and  reference  prices in  1986-88 reported in  th1e  supplemenlary lables  in  the country
Schedules.  The OECD provides PSE estimates beginning in 1979 Ior 12 OECD trading blocs and
up  to  22  commodities or  commodity groups.  The  USDA has  extended this  coverage  to  34
countries and 48  commodities or commodity groups,  lor the period  1982-93."  Four  types of'
measures are included in the OECD  and  USDAIERS PSE  calculations,  namely. market price
support,  direct  income support,  indirect income support  and  otlher assistance.  Price  support
"II  am grateful to Susan l1cetmaa lor providing the as yet unpublishedl  dlata  on ERS/USI)A updlates  oni PSE estimates.
16programs, tariffs, and quotas are examples of the tirst set of measures, while deficiency payments
comprised the second group.  Indirect income supports and other assistance include input subsidies,
capital grants, research etc.  To estimate the tariff  equivalent of border protection based on the
PSE estimates, I consider only the effects of market price support measures (price support, tariffs,
quotas, and other NTBs) and exclude the direct and indirect income transfers and other assistance.
The tariff  equivalents based on data about market price support  measures from the OECD and
USDA databases are calculated as follows:
(1)  =  I(VPIP/VPWP)-I]  *100
wlhere  X  =  tariff equivalent
VPIP  =  value of production at internal prices
VPWP  =  value of production at world prices
The value of production at world prices, VPWP, is defined as:
VPWP  VPIP - MPS where
MPS  =  Q *(Pd - P)  or the value of market price support
Q  =  volume of production
Therefore,  C  =  (Pd - Pw)/Pow or  (Pd / Pwo)  -1 * 100
where Pd is the domestic  price and Pco  is the reference (border) price at which purchases from the
world market could have taken place.  MPS is the value of all market price support -- an estimate
ol aggregate transf'ers to producers as a result of measures such as tariffs, import quotas, and other
trade barriers.  The dif'l'erence  between world prices and internal prices, as a percentage of world
prices is the tariff' equivalent of' border measures.  This  is measured either  as an import tariff
(subsidy) or an export subsidy (tax), or both.  If domestic prices are above (below) world prices,
the price  wedge reflects an export subsidy (tax) equivalent for exportables and an import tariff
(subsidy) equivalent for importables.
17For  purposes of comparison, I  also estimate a  pre-UR  tariff  equivalent based  on  the
reported internal and reference prices in the country Schedules for the base period,  1986-88.  The
Modalities defined internal prices at the wholesale level. However, not all countries used wholesale
prices in defining their tariff equivalent (e.g. EU's  tariff equivalent are based on  intervention or
threshold prices).  Where the wholesale price is not available, I use producer prices as a measure of
internal prices.  The use of producer prices will result in some slight underestimation of protection
by the amount of the producer-to-wholesale marketing margin.
3.2  Post-UR Border Protection
As explained earlier, the tariffication provisions as stated in Ilhe Modalities lose legal
power once the count,y  Schedules have been mutually accepted by participating countries.  I
brietly  review in this section the rules on tarit'lication as provided in ilie Modaliiies.  The
methods used in estimating the post-UR taritl'equivalents are then discussed.
Tariff equivalents were required to be established at the lour-digit level or at the six-digit
or more detailed level ol' the Harmonized System (HS) wherever appropriate,  as in the case  of'
certain  fruits  and  vegetables.  The  Modalities also  required  tilat  "actual  prices,  rather  tllan
constructed ones (e.g. the threshold price in the EU) he the basis  lor larif'l' equivalents."  For
transformed and processed agricultural products, taril'f equivalents were required to be established
by multiplying the specilic tarifl' equivalent(s) for the agricultural inputs(s) by thc proportion(s) in
value terms or in physical terms as appropriate of' the agricultural inputs(s) in tIhe tranislorimied
processed agricultural products.
The Modalities also specilied the external prices to be used in larillication as the actual
average c.i.f. import unit values lor the importing country.  Where average c.i.f. unit values are not
available or appropriate,  external prices are delined as the appropriate average c.i.l.  import unit
IXvalues of a  near country or the estimated  average f.o.b. unit values of (an) appropriate major
exporter(s) adjusted by adding an estimate of insurance, freight, and other relevant costs to the
importing country.  External prices are converted to domestic currencies using the annual average
market exchange rate  for the same period as the price data.  Internal prices are defined in  the
Modalities as the representative wholesale price ruling in the domestic market or an estimate of that
price where adequate data are not available.  The initial tariff equivalents have to be adjusted to
take account of differences in quality or variety and applied to tariff  lines which are frequently
defined at 8, 10, orl2 digit levels.
Where a  tariff  equivalent resulting from these guidelines is  negative or  lower than  the
current bound rate, countries were allowed to  establish the initial base  tariff  equivalent at the
current  bound rate  or  on  the  basis  of  national offers  for  that  product.  The levels  of tariff
equivalents resulting from tariffication using 1986-88 data, supplemented by  the rules as stated
above, are specified as the base level (i.e. to be applied in  1995) for the implementation of the
reduction commitments on market access.
The  post-UR  nominal  border  protection  rates  are  derived  from  the  tariffication
commitments.  In this paper, the specific tariffs in the Schedule, assumed to reflect the difference
between internal and border prices as defined in the Modalities, [T =  (Pd  - Po))], are translated
into ad-valorem  tariff equivalents simply by dividing the specific tariff by the appropriate border
price as defined in the Mddalities.  The average border price  in  1986-88 used in estimating the
pre-UR tariff.equivalents of NTBs are now used to convert the post-UR base specific tariffs in the
Schedules into ad-valorern rates in the base period.  To translate the final or bound specific tariffs
in the schedules (tariffs to apply at the end of the implementation period) into final ad-valorem
rates,  I use either (a) constant world prices at the level during the base period,  1986-88 or (b)
World Bank projections of world prices for the year 2000.
19Since our  estimated pre-UR tariff  equivalents of NTBs are based on  available data on
world and domestic prices, which are usually at wholesale or farmgate level, the post-UR specific
tariffs,  which are at  very disaggregated tariff line level in the Schedules, must be aggregated to
attempt to match the pre-UR measures.  An average specific tariff corresponding to the commodity
defined at the 4-digit HS code is calculated by taking a simple unweighted average ol' the tariffs for
the group under consideration.  Unweighted  tariffs are pref'erred over trade-weighted tariffs, whlicl
may  be biased downward because imports that  are highly taxed cost  inore and are,  thcrefore,
imported less.  In the extreme, a tariff set at sufliciently hligh  level as to elinminate  imports would
receive no weight in the aggregation.
In the case  of commodities where the historical estimates ol' protection (based on  the
OECD and USDA data) are defined at the  arnrmgate/lirst  stage of trade, the specitfic  tariff's ol tile
processed items are transformed using appropriate conversion factors. 2  This  is not an issue for
commodities such as grains (wheat, maize, barley, oats, rye and sorghum) or white sugar, whlic
are reasonably homogenous and whose post-UR tarill' equivalents are specified in the Sclhedules.
For dairy, where the historical protection estimates based on OECD and USDA data are lor the
dairy industry, the post-UR tarif'fs are adjusted using conversion f:actors to derive the milk fluid
equivalent of milk powder and butter.  The estimated ad-valoreni  taril'l'  rates at the 4-digit HS are
aggregated to match the commodity and regional delinitions ol' the RUNS model using value ot'
production at border prices.' 3 The tariffs specitied lor "within access" cominmitmnents  in the tariffl
quota are assumed to be inl'ra marginal and only to represent an income transter.
1
2For instance.  milk  is assessed  as liquidl milk  plus fluid equivalent  of  hutter anad  milk  powder in the OFCI)  ali(
USDA  calculations of PSIH.  The same conversion factors lor butter andl milk are used in this paper to estiinate the
average specific tariff for the milk inclustry.
13  To facilitate further analyses of  implications of the Uruguay Roundl  AgreemeniT  the prc- and post-Ui uguay Round
border protection in agriculture estimated in this paper are lurther aggregatedl  to conlormn (o  the requircinlents  ol
general equilibrium models.
20For exportables, the post-UR border protection will be determined by the export subsidy
conumitments.  As described in section 2, the commitments on export subsidies are in terms of
maximum volume and  budget outlays defined for major group  of commodities.  A 36  percent
reduction in the value of export subsidies by  a particular country would typically require a less
than  36 percent reduction in the ad-valorem equivalent of the export subsidy since the decline in
value would result from changes in both the rate of assistance and in the quantity exported.  In the
context of multilateral reforms under the Round, reductions in export subsidies are likely to raise
world  prices,  offsetting the reduction  in  export volumes implied by  the  reductions  in  export
subsidies.  Thus, treating the export subsidy reductions in terms of reductions in export subsidy
rates could be used as an approximation to the effects of the commitments.  The per unit export
subsidy rates at the base period is determined as follows:  ,s =  4  where s is the subsidy rate,
B is the total value of export refunds and X is total volume of exports and P is the share of exports
that  is  subsidized.  The  subscript  s denotes the  goods which  are  net exports  and  use  export
subsidies.  The per unit subsidy rates during the base period are translated to ad-valorem rates
using border prices in 1986-88. There are goods which are treated as net exportables in estimating
historical protection based on the OECD and USDA databases but do  not have export subsidy
commitments in the Round.  In these commodities, some imports occur and the post-UR border
protection are estimated based on the tariffication commitments.4 In most of these commodities,
import restrictions are  usually an essential backcstop  for  export subsidy  programs.  The  tarifi'
equivalent  based  on  the  tariffication  commitments  defines  the  maximum  post-UR  border
protection.
14The estimates will he slightly biased hy the amount of the margin between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices which in most
primary agricultural products are usually not more than 20 percent.
214.  Results of Taritrlcation  and Tariff Bindings
4.1  How "Dirty" Was Tariffication?
The UR Modalities specified that the initial base tariffs (specific or ad-valorem) should be
set at levels that provide equivalent protection in 1986-88.  To examine "dirty" tariffication, the
estimated tariff equivalents based on the country Sclhedules  are compared with the estimated tariff
equivalent of border measures in 1986-88.  The results indicate that the specific and ad-valorem
tariffs which many countries hiave  set in their schedules are significantly higher than  the wedge
between actual  domestic and  world  market prices in the  base  period,  hence  affording 1higher
protection than prevailed in 1986-88.
Also, the clhosen  base period of tariffication was a period of relatively high agricultural
support and protection in the industrial countries because world prices were at their lowest level in
recent decades during tlhe  period.  Hence. the tariff equivalent based on the 1986-88 period would
result in highi  levels ol' protection compared with any representative period.
The actual  tarill' equivalents of all  border measures in  1986-88 and the post-UR base
tariffs  lor several major commodities are summarized in Table 2a and  2b.  In many countries,
"dirty" tarif'lication appears to have occurred in the "sensitive" commodities such as dairy, sugar,
and -rains.  The extent of' "dirty" tariffication varied widely amono countries and commodities.
Among thle  industrial countries,  hlic  magnitude appears largest in the European Union and EFTA,
wlhere  the post-UR base tariff ecquivalents  in most commodities were set at levels way above the
estimated 1986-88 price wedges.  In the European Union (EU). ilte estimated post-UR ad-valorem
larif'f'  equivalents are siinilicanvliihlier  than t(le actual rates oI protection in  19X6-XX  except for
poultry.  The lareest dil'l'erentials  (in pcrcentage points) are estimated lor rice (2t)7 percent). milk
(97.2 percent). butter (72 percent). sugar (63 percent). barley (58.5 percent). durum wlheat (52.6
percent) and slhecpmeat  (21 percent).
22In the case of wheat, rye, barley, maize, and sorghum, the EU Schedule had set the specific
duty-paid import price to be not greater than the effective intervention price  (or in the event of
modification of CAP, the effective support price) increased by 55 percent (EU Schedule, Section 1,
Headnotes).  This implies that the current effective  threshold price for grains would be 155 percent
of the intervention price.  In the case of rice, the specific duty is set at a level so that the duty-paid
import price  will not be greater than the effective intervention price increased by 88 percent for
Japonica rice and by 80 percent for Indica rice.
Among the EFTA countries, Austria, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland established tariff
equivalents which  built  in  the  scope  for  significantly more protection  in major  commodities,
particularly sugar, dairy products, wheat, beef and veal, pork  and sheepmeat.  The United States
also raised base  protection in sugar  by  an estimated 66  percent, while Canada  increased base
tariffs relative to the actual 1986-88 levels by more than  100 percent in dairy products and more
than 200 percent in poultry.  Japan offered base tariff equivalents which were way below the actual
nominal rate of protection they enjoyed in 1986-88 in all the commodities considered.  However.
Japan obtained a special arrangement on rice whereby tariffication is delayed, and did anyway start
from very high levels.
4.2  Tariff Bindings in Developing  Countries
Developing countries had the option of establishing ceiling binding on commodities not
previously subject to bound tariffs.  The results indicate large variations in patterns  of pre-UR
protection  and  post-UR  agricultural  tariff  bindings.  As  in  the  industrial  countries,  many
developing countries offered very high base tariffs in several major commodities.  In most cases,
these bindings were set at levels way above historical protection.  Several countries (i.e., Egypt,
Pakistan,  Zimbabwe),  which have  maintained import subsidies or  expnrt  taxes  (indicated  by
23negative historical  tariff  equivalents) in  major  food crops,  also  established  maximum ceiling
bindings.
In the case of wheat, a major importable in developing countries, significantly higher base
tariff equivalents than actual pre-UR levels were established in several countries, including India
(+98 percent), Pakistan (+171 percent), Colombia (+118 percent), and Morocco (+210 percent).
In the case of rice, several net importing countries also offered higher base nominal protection than
actual levels in the base period, witlh  the largest differences occurring in Bangladesh. Colombia,
and Mexico.  The same occurred in coarse grains, where higher base tariff equivalents were set in
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, and Morocco.  It is interesting to
note, however, that these levels of allowable protection are below  those historically applied in the
industrial  countries.  In rice,  Ior  example, increased  allowable base  protection  are  shown in
Nigeria,  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  Indonesia,  Thailand,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Egypt,  and  Czech
Republic, but only at levels slightly above one-third of the rates applied in Japan.
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile  generally  offered  lower  base  tariff  equivalents in  most
com11modities  (ranging from 25 percent to 55 percent in 1995 ) than otlher  Latin American countries.
For examiple,  (he tari'f' equivalents in  1995 for sugar were established at higl  levels in Colombia
(  13) percent). Jamaica (100 percent). Mexico (173 percent). and Venezuela (100 per-cent). Similar
patterns of' high base tariff equivalents are observed in these countries tor major products sucIh  as
wlheat,  coarse grains, rice, (dairy  products and poultry.  In Asia. India has bound most agricultural
taril'f's at  prohlibitive levels but established a  zero  tariff  hinding on  major grains  such as  rice.
sorghum. and mii.ize.
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The  effective  exemption  of  agriculture  from  GATI  disciplines  has  facilitated  an
agricultural policy in OECD countries characterized by strong protection of domestic producers by
means of  trade  restrictions  and  direct  price  support,  in  contrast  with  policies of  developing
countries  which have  effectively taxed  agriculture by  means of  export  taxes  and  overvalued
exchange rates.  During the 1980s, while many developing countries came under heavy external
pressure to liberalize trade, most industrial countries maintained or even increased protection in
agriculture.  When the UR began in the mid-1980s, the gap between domestic and world prices of
agricultural products in OECD countries averaged nearly 80 percent, compared to 41 percent in
1979-81.  Figure 1 shows the average nominal protection for agriculture (weighted average using
value of production at border prices as weights) in the OECD as a whole and individual countries
since the mid-1980s.  It shows that only limited policy changes were carried out to reduce border
protection during the pre-UR period.  Domestic markets in most countries were largely isolated
Irom price movements on the world markets.  Most of the reforms, with the exception of New
Zealand  and  Australia, where  support levels are  already very low, have  focused on  domestic
support  mechanisms.  Linited  reforms were made in reducing export subsidies, import taxes.
tarill:s and other  technical harriers to trade.  By  1992,  the  nominal protection coefficient for
agriculture  remained at very highl  levels, estimated at  about 74 percent for  OECD as a  whole.
There were considerable variations among countries. The largest price wedges in 1989-92  were in
Japan and EFTA countries, and the lowest were in New Zealand and Australia.  Among individual
commiiodities,  the largest protection was afforded to rice in Japan. with a nominal protection rate of
about 480  percent  in  1992.  Otlher agricultural  commodities heavily protected  in  the  OECD
countries include milk. shelcpmeat  and sugar.  Nominal protection in these sectors averaged more
lhan  27()  percent during the 1980)s.
26In contrast, current evidence indicates that domestic agricultural prices in most developing
countries  remain  below  international prices,  with  the  greatest  taxation  occurring  in  export
commodities (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes, 1988, 1991; USDA,  1994).  These policies are not
disciplined in the GATT.  An important question is how much trade liberalization and how much
reduction in protection will be achieved in agriculture following  the Uruguay Round.  This section
provides some quantitative answers to these questions.
5.1  Industrial  Countries
European  Union
Although the conversion of  non-tariff measures to  tariffs  would bring  agriculture
closely in line with the rules of the GATT for other products, the tariffication process  has
eroded the extent of the anticipated liberalization in major commodities in many countries. The
high  levels of base  tariffs  after  tariffication  were due  not only  to  actual  high  levels of
protection in the base period but also to the choice of prices used in establishing the tariff
equivalents during the base period.  In addition, the tariff bindings in the base period are high
relative to the rates of protection resulting under current policies.  Even after being reduced by
at least 15 percent by the end of the period, the tariff equivalents in many commodities remain
higher than the average level of protection in 1982-93.
Estimates of pre- and post-UR border protection in the European Union are shown in
Table  3.  The European  Union has protected  its domestic agricultural  markets through  a
complex  mechanism of supports.  Variable  levies keep  imports  out  while domestic price
support  (guaranteed intervention price) maintains domestic prices  well above world prices.
When the world price is lower than the threshold price, imports are subject to a levy equal to
the difference between the world and threshold price.  The amount of protection has been high,
with an estimated average nominal protection for crops and livestock products of 171 percent
27during 1979-92.  The estimates in Table 3 indicate that most commodities in the EU received
high protection during the pre-UR period (1979-93), with the highest rates on sheepmeat (155
percent), sugar  (150 percent), manufactured milk (128 percent), beef and veal (84 percent),
barley (83 percent), rice (82 percent), maize (69 percent) and durum wheat (58 percent).  Oats,
poultry meat, and pork received relatively lower protection, ranging from 20-37 percent.
During the UR negotiations, the EU had begun to reform its Common Agricultural
Policy  by  reducing the  level of  price  support  and  providing direct  income compensation
payments to farmers instead.  Combined with increases in world prices, these reforms  resulted
in a decline in the rate of border protection in most commodities since the base period (1986-
88).  This  is shown in Table  3 where the average tariff  equivalents of border measures in
recent years (1989-93) are below tlhe  levels in 1986-88  in the case of grains, sugar, other meat
(poultry and pork), and dairy products. The pattern of post-UR protection in the EU would
depend on the level ot' world prices and the maximum tariff allowed in the GATT.  Further,
additional protection can be applied on all imports under the Special Safeguards against low
world prices.  The EU provided an additional commitment  on its tariff for grains in the form of
a maximum duty-paid price linked to the intervention price.  That is. for major grains the duty-
paid  import price  shall not exceed a  domestic intervention price  plus 55  percent. and  for
lhusked rice it shall he no  greater than  the intervention price  plus 80-88  percent.  The 55
percent and the X0-8X  percent appear to represent the mark-up between the threshold price and
intervention prices for major grains and rice, respectively, under CAP reform.
28Table 3.  European Union BordierProtection
HS Codc  Cosiniodity  P osl-l'R  Final  Fin.,I  Fi-al  Pre-llR  DL rfy  hamipe  in protefiaon
lariffs  Equnisalrrir  I,llt  irt  o,rl  T.Iriffs Eqpiivalenl  so  if-
.isc  FPad  209i!  21  -,  21391  Ir.aIOili
latc  tale  Foriar  Lower  Uppcr  1986-88  1989-93  79-93  Base - Finall-  Final - Final  /
(1996-S"  Prices)  Boond  Bomnd  (3L  )  (91)  Pre-UR  89-93  79-93  Basc
1)201,2  Beef&  Veall  125.42  %  I1  9.S  I-,  01.7!?  73.iS  83.'.  970  S411  42.43  -12.7!  -1.73  -36.%
12-9.4
0203  Pork  51.7%  t  2 9  o  29.60  25.3  29 9%  4t'0  25.0  230  11.70  7.91  9.90  -36.4%
38.1
9204  Mutton & Lamb  210.5,0  134.7%  1 71 .1  103.6%  122.5|  189.1)  95.0  155.0  21.49  39.70  -20.30  -36.09%
24s.  1
0207  Potiltry  44.5%  2S.5S  24.7%  21.9%  25.9%.  51.0  42.11  16.0  -9.52  -13.54  -7.54  -36.0%
6905
MNanufactLuedMilk  288.5%  204.°i.  17811%  157.5%  196.2%o  177.9  147.0  129.0  111.50  57.79  76.79  -29.0%
0402  Milk powder  170.8%  127.69  111.0%  98.2%  116.0%
040210  Skim Milk Powder  229.0%  183.1  159.3  %  140.9%  166.5%  1/%/  4J) 9  %  -45.9%
04022110  Whole Milk powder  143.9%  92.1°  80.1%  70.8%  83.7%
04022190  Other  9t.3%  52.1%,  45.3%  40.1%  47.3%
0405  Butter  348.6%  209.3%  181.1  %  160.2%  189.3C  -140.3%
0407  Eggs  68.4%  43.7%  3S.0%  33.7%  39.8 7%  23.03  15.39  13.00  45.33  28.36  30.75  -36.0%
100110  DurumnWheat  155.6%  99.7%  74.9%  70.2%  84.5C  103.0  77.1  5S.3  52.56  22.56  41.36  -35.9%
69.3
100190  ContmonWheat  172.3°%  109.8%7  82.6%  77.3%  93.1 .o  106.6  67.1  56.4  65.65  42.73  53.43  -36.2%
81.7
1002  Rye  R68.3%  138.2%.  103.9%  97.3%  117.1%.  61.3  51.9%
187.1
1003  Barley  215.5%I  138.2%  103.9%  97.3%  117.1%  157.0  95.0  83.0  58.45  43.19  55.19  -35.9%
187.1
1004  Oats  123.6%  79.1%  59.5%  55.7%  67.0T  56.0  46.0  37.0  67.56  33.11  42.11  -36.0%
64.9
1005  Maize  160.0%  102.3°7  76.9%  72.0%  86.7%  109.1  89.0  69.0  50.96  13.29  33.29  -36.1%
121.3
1006  Rice  360.5%  230 69  173.4%  162.4%  1955°1  153.0)  103.0  82.1)  20,7.53  127.63  148.63  -36.0%
149.5
10062055  Huisked(brown,ice)  407.6%  260.6%z  195.9%  183.5%  220.8%r
100630  Seojii-miilled  or wholly ni  362.9%  232.2%.  174.6%  163.5%  196.8%
100640  Brokenrice  311.1%  199.1S  1497%  140.2%  16S.7S
1007  Sorghunii  171.5%  1097%  92.5%  77.2%  93.0%  120.4  -61.8%T
Oils(a) and oilseeds
1201  Soybeans  0.0%  O.9%.  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
1507.10  Soybean  oil  10.0%  6.4%S  6.4%  6.4%.  6.4%
1202  Peaanuts  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%1,  0.09  0.0%
1508.10  Peanut  oil  10.0%1)  6.4%  f  4%  6.4  %  6.4%
1205  Rapeseed  n.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0(%  0.1)  0.0  0.0  "1.00  0.00  0.00  0.0%.
157.7
1514.10  Rapeseed  oil  10.0°%,  6.401  6.4%  6.4%  6.4%,
1206  Sanflower seed  0.11%  0.%  0Q.0%  0.0%  0.0%  n n  0.0  0  0  11.00  0.00  0.00  0.0%
Sulgar''
121291  Sugarbectdriedorpowd  275.7%  220.1%  234.0  144.0  150.0  41.65  76.14  70.14  -20.1%
170111  sugar (for refoiing)  296.9%.  279.4%  151.t.%  94.7%  273.9%  234.0  144')  150.0  62.96  135.35  129.35  -5.0%
216.9
White Sugar  234l0  144.0  150.0
216.'9
2401.10  Tobacco  14.0%  11.2%7  11).2%  11.2%  11.2%.
5101  Wool  0.0%<  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0  0.0  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.0  %,
5201  Cotlon, Not  carded or col  1.4%.  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
5301  Jle r  0.0%  0.0%  Ia.%  0.0%  0.0%
AGGREGATION OF COM MODITES
I  WHEAT  170.1I,  108l.5  9 81.69%  76.4%  92.0%  1146  68  57  64.10  13.2  250  -36.2%
2  RICE  360.5  %  2310.6%  173,4%  162.4%  19S.5%  I53  103  82  207.5  70.4  91.4  -36.0%
3  COARSEGRAINS  189.3'%  121.3  %  91.2%  85.4%  102.9%  133  99  74  56.7  2.3  16.7  -35.9'1
4  SUGAR  297%o  279%'  152%  95%  274%  234  144  lSi  62.9  7.6  I  k  -S 9n.i
5  MEAT  96.1%i.  96.9%7,  75.6%  66.89%1 79.0%  96  97  93  0.2  -21.2  -17.1  -9.6%
6  OTHER MEAT  52.9%  33.7%  29.3%  26.1%i  39.7%  40  27  24  -2.5  2.2  5.2  -16.4%S
7  COFFEE  12.8%  6.2%  6.2%  6.2%  6.2%  ne,  na  1r.a
8  COCOA  8.3%!  4 3%  4.3%  4.3  %  4.30  .i  Da  In
9  TFA\  2.5  %  0.8%  9.8%  0.8%  0.  00  |  na  na  :l,
10  OILSEEDS  0.11O,  ()  10%  0.0  %  0.  %  0.0%  an  na  1.  0 0  11.0  0.0  0.0%.
11  M[LK  289.5'?  204.9%1, 178 1  %  157.5%  186.2°7  |  177  147  128  111.5  31.1  50 1  -29.0%
12  FRUITS & VEGETABLE  I9.1'-;  13.2%  13.2%  13.2%i.  132%  IIa  1n.1  en
13  WOOL  (1.0%  1).1I%  0.0%  0.05  9.0%  ]  na  1a1  an  o  0.(1  0.0  0.0%
14  COTTON  1.4S  9).O%.  9.0%  0.0%  0.0  %  I'ol  ina  Iaa
15  OTHER NON FOOD  14.0%  11.2'.i  11.2%  11.2%  1  1.2  %  ..  Tia  na  o
Awrage(unweighted)  I00.8%  73.4%  54.4%  47.0%  66.4%.  62.546  45.009  40.53  -27.2%
standard  deviation  127.2%  95.6%  66.7%  57.1%  88.0%  80.365  56.846  52.71
'rosnverc,,e  tacrs  jI  .,tV-jWlIcSoisr=-  tsI.tI,n-.  1ka  cIar.,,  ..r=  4 tSnso,r.aSo t-
in itllch.  eoiailes.iiiai,t,  .r.'irittn  Ir..  rn- i.,  .masSe-  >>liii
Exsoate-E11.  air  It  tru  Iirp  eerosnr'1  l  ticket  coo;  actcoLi  ccc-.  sC.i;t  tiriier.Iao,r
ire  Ilh ta.r.  Cr Sieioees
'ice iriervrr,e  ilntIerstinelis  ae Lep  hive  r'ro,t  picrt  .-voictireve  iel18-I . 5iunmmllllopt?pllr
and  lice  irnttlabor  lcitedonesiic eaket iron, siy\]sttraIv  tlfr,ieoemloc  nlXna  sexpot  rhn,.t,eal
Soolrce  Anithor  s caritnUlltons;  baisc  data  are fro I  Ixrriga  ay  Rooold  coointry  achedolles
29Hence, this provision allows the EU to charge tariffs at levels necessary to defend its
already set threshold prices under CAP reform, as long as the duty charged does not exceed the
binding.  In practice, this can work similarly to a variable levy or a minimum  price.  The actual
import tariff levied on c.i.f. prices would be the difference between the domestic mark-up and
the  world price  (c.i.f).  Hence, in periods  of particularly  low  world  prices,  the  EU  will
probably charge a high tariff so as to maintain the agreed "Community preference" but at  a
level not exceeding the tariff binding.  If world prices are high, the EU border regime may not
in practice be much different from what it would have been under CAP reform.  That is, when
world prices are high, the EU will charge a lower tariff so as not to exceed the commitment on
"maximum duty-paid import price" to maintain the level of thresiold prices already set under
CAP  reform  policies.  The determination of the actual tariff  on  grains  would however be
shipment specific, in contrast to the pre-UR regime where the levy, calculated as the difference
between the threshold price and a world price determined by the Commission, is charged on all
imports irrespective of' the actual price of the shipment.  Under the GATT commitment, the
actual tariff will be calculated based on the price of the specific grain shipment to ensure that
the duty-paid price lor each shipment will not exceed 155 percent of the intervention price.
Based on  World Bank world price  projections, the  ad-valorem equivalents of' the
hound specitfic tariffs lor major agricultural commodities are shown in Table 3.  Relative to
average protection levels in recent years and in the base period (1986-88), the post-UR base
and l'inal tarii'  equivalents are signif-icantly  higiler in most cominodities. The dil'ference  is even
larger  when comiipared  with the average during  1979-93.  It' the EU applied the  maximum
specilic tariffs comimiitted  in the UR. the estimated post-UR ad-valorem tarif'l' equivalents in
1995 and  20)()()  indicate signillicant potential increases in protection in  major comiimodities
relative to recent levels and relative to the average protection over the last lil'teen  years.
30The  estimates also  provides evidence of  uneven reductions in  tariffs among
commodities,  with the smallest percent reduction  in "sensitive"  commodities  such as sugar.
The uneven  tariff cuts also appears  to result in higher  dispersion  in protection  in the base and
final  period  than in the  pre-UR  regime.
.Jaian
In Japan, a complex  system of fixed  and variable  levies  has kept internal  prices well
above  world  prices. Protection  for all major  commodities  in Japan is provided  largely  through
administered  prices  maintained  by tariffs and import  restrictions. Japanese  raw sugar prices,
for instance, were eight times the world  price in 1985-86,  while  rice and wheat prices were
more  than six times the world  price during the same  period. Estimates  of pre- and post-UR
border protection  for Japan are shown in Table 4*1 Border protection  has fallen in recent
years, but remains very high in rice, dairy products, wheat, barley and sugar.  In contrast,
protection  in the Japanese  beef sector  has declined  from 70 percent  to 60 percent  in 1992 and
to 50 percent in 1993. Interestingly,  Japan appears  to have carried  out significant  reductions
in protection  in major commodities  in the UR as shown  by the estimates  in Table 4.  Japan
committed  to further  reduce  the ad-valorem  tariff on beef  to 38.5 percent. However,  the post-
UR tariff equivalents  for milk, sugar, and wheat  remain  prohibitive. Japan agreed  to convert
all NTBs to tariffs, except for rice, where  tariffication  was delayed  but a higher minimum
access commitment  (4-8 percent  of domestic  consumption  over the implementation  period) is
provided.
1  The estimates of pre-UR protection are based on prices used by the OECD in estimating Producer Subsidy
Equivalents.  The pre-UR ad-valorem equivalent on wheat based on government resale prices results in lower
protection (279 percent) than is reported in the Table 4, but remain higher than the post-UR base period estimates.
Further analysis will he done to estimate the pre-UR ad-valorem equivalents based on resale prices for other
commodities.
31Table 4. Japan Border Proleclion
Coliuilodity  Post  UR  Final  Fial  Final  Pre tlR border  protection  I  Dirty  Change  in protection
Tariff Equivalent  Rate  Rate  Rate  Tariff equivaient  Tariflication
Base  Fiial  2000  2000  2000  86-88  Final-  FiMal-  Final/
(1986-88  prices)  Point  Lower  Upper
Bound  Bounid  Base-
79-93  86-88  89-93  PIre-UR  89-93  79-93  Base
AC,GREGATION OF COM1MO0DITI  S
I  WHEAT  239.6%  202.71'  152.4%  142.8%  171.8%  308.%  651.%  492.%  -411.4  -340  -156  -15%
2  RICE  203.%  500.%  402.%
3  COARSEGRAINS  233.1 %  197.7%'  148.6%  139.2%  167.5%  336.%  679.%  566.%  -445.9  -417  -187  -15%
4  SUGAR  126.1%  107.2',  57.9%  36.3%  105.1%  126.%  184.%  155.%  -57.9  -97  -68  -15%
5  MEAT  93.0%  38.5%  38.5%  38.5%  38.5%  30.%  87.%  40.%  6.0  -2  9  -59%
6  OTHERMEAT  49.8%  48.2%  48.2%  48.2%  48.2%  43.4%  55.1%  62.7%  -5.2  -14  5  -3%
7  COFFEE  10.0%  6.0q  6.0%  6.0%  6.0%  -40%
8  (COCOA  4.4%  1.9%t  1.9%  1.9%  1.9%  -57%
9  TEA  16.3%  12.3%  12.3%  12.3%  12.3%  -25%
10  OILSEEDS  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.%  0.%  0.%  0.0  0  0  0%
It  MILK  489.4%  424.2%,  326.3%  286.6%  372.1%  207.%  501.%  389.%  -11.6  -63  119  -13%
12  FRUITTS  &VEGETABLES  16.3%  13.3%  13.3%  13.3%  13.3%  16.3  -18%
13  WOOL  0.0  %  0.0%,  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0%
14  COTTON  0.0%  0.(%  0.0%  0.0%  0.051  0%
15  OTIIERNONFOOD  0.0  %  0.(0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.001
Average  (I1nwighledl)  91.3%  75.1S1%  57.5%  51.S%  66.9%  156.7%  332.1%  263.3%
Slandardldevialion  136.9%  1  15.5%,  89.8%  80.1%  103.0%  119.4%  261.7%  209.2%
Convsrsiots factors:
Pork: Boneless  = 1.36 carcass  weight
I  toii  ofWlrite Sugar = 1.356  on of Raw (cane)  ssigar
'Not  for sowing
Pere  I R hIrdor  tmeasures
1'ricc s.atbilizatiwa  on Stigar;  uniposes  lcvics  aund  surcharges  oni  iriported sugar  when himport  prices  are  low.
'rihe  Food Agcucy conitrolled  (ie  purrchaseanI  nuvarketing  of donicestic  ansd  uhiported  Barely, Rice  and Wheat.  It also
rcgulates  uinports  oidairy  products  and iriost  beef.
Souirce:  Aurthlor's calculjations; hasic d3la arc tIoii  Urlucguay  Rounid  country schedLules.
North America and Australia
In the United Statcs. tariffication has a direct eft'fect  on the policies for beef, sugar and
dairy products.  Both sugar and milk are assisted through administered  prices, w1lich are
supported  by taritTs and import quotas.  The Meat  Import Law  and associated  voluntary
export  restraint  arranrements  (VERs) havc  hcen  the main  source of protection for the US beef
industry.  On main export products,  the Export Enhancement Program  (EEP) provides a
liscrctionary authority to provi(de export subsidies. The pre-  and post-UR rates  of border
protection  are shown  in Tahle 5.  The post-UR  base  ad-valorem tariff equivalents  of import
qluotas  indicate  higher  level ol protection ilian those  applying  in the base  period. 1986-X8. In
addition.  sugar  and  dairy products  will remain  highily  protected with very higih  tarifls charged
at  the  end  of'thie  implementation  period.
32Table 5.  United States  Border  Protection
Corruliodity  Post  UR  Final  FisI'm  Final  Pre  UR  Dirty  Chiiige inprolecdio
Tariffs  Equivalent  Rate  Rale  Rate  Tarffeqitivua]ii  tai  tf6casoll
Base  Bound  2001)  20001  2000  x6-88  FInal  FiIal - FNitalI
rate  rale  Lower  Upter  Base -
(1986-88priees)  Point  Bound  Bound  82-92  R6-88  89-93  PTe-UR  R9-92  S2-92  |  Base
AGGREGATION OF COMMODITIES
I  WHEAT  6%,,  4%  4re  4  4%  13%  20-,  201%  -14  2  14  -36%
2 RICE  5%  3%l.  3  3%  3  It  I'%  2'  4  i  -I  -36%
3 COARSEGRAINS  8%q  2%  ,  2%  2  2'.  2%  42  2',  5  -65  -124  -74%
4  SUGAR  197%  16RT,  91%G  57%a  164%,  126%1  131  %  671  67  XI  166  -15%,
5 NIEAT  31%  26%  26%r  26%  26%,  2%v  3%,  2"'i  27  25  24  -15%'
6 OTHERMEffi  AT  4%  3,  3%bo  3%  3%,  2%S  6%  1%e  0  3  5  -36%
7 COFFEE  0%  0%  0  (0%  0  0%o  3%,  0%,  0%
9 COCOA  0  %  0%  1%  (0%  0D  (%  0%,  1  -60%
9 TEA  3%  s  %  2%  '%  2'  2%  2r%  2T  36
10 OILSEEDS  0%  01%  0%  0%  0%.'  0%  0%  0%'  t  -46  -92  0%f
It  MILK  144%  122q%  03%  8  3%  107%L  92%,  132%1  46  1[2  43  122  -15
12 FRJITS&VIVGETABLI  91%  77%.  77%  77%  77%  116%'y
13 WOOL  7  %  4%  4S%  4,  4%  Y.  7a  0n  4  4  -42%Y,
1  COTTON  31%  26%-  26%,  26%  2'%,  -15%,,
15 OTHER  NON FOOD  19%  I %  80%  8%,  8%  -56%'
Average (Unwetghted)  36%  30%'  23%  20%  28%,  2I%  25%,  13-
Stacldard  devlatloii  60%  5  2%  35a,  29%7,  44%1  42%.  50%.  22%
Coiiversioni  factors:
Boneless  = 1.36 carcass weight: Carcass weight = 1 85 Line aririnal
I nS  Of Fresh  table grapes = 1172866  NIT
OECD referencepricestisea  forBeefanid  Veal, Fignieat, Sieepnieat, Sigar  and Wool
Imnport  onit values u  sed in all other coiuiocbdlies
Soirce:  USDA (89-93). 86-RR: adtisted using  rate of growth in UN trade dala
Pre  UR border  ieasutres:
hiporl  tari  ffs; Barley, Poultry, Rice, Wheat; Frice support/qootas, Milk, SII  gar, Tarilfn and Beef PFrchases;  Beef aid Veal
(a) except Mainufactured uilk. Barley, oats, rye: USDA
(b) Beef and Veal. Manufactured rtilk aud Sugar represeut CIF prices
Souirce: Auithor's  calculations;  basic data  are frotii Uruguiay Rosind  couintry schedilles.
In Canada, production of milk, dairy products, poultry meat, and eggs received high
protection  during  the  pre-UR  period  through  support  from  stabilization  programs,
transportation  subsidies and  quantitative import restrictions.  In Australia.  the progressive
reduction in the tariff imposed on sugar has made the sector more exposed to international
markets, but the remaining tariff still provides a significant amount of protection.  Prior to the
late  1980s, there was an administered home consumption price on sugar which, on  average,
resulted in negative rates of protection.
335.2 Developing  Countries
The UR negotiations  provided  the opportunity  for developing  countries  to increase  their
integration  into the international  trading  system. For the first time, many  countries  participated  in
the negotiations  and increased  the extent  to which  their domestic  protection  will  be subject  to tariff
bindings. Developing  countries  as a whole  increased  the proportion  of agricultural  product lines
subject to tariff bindings from 18 to 100 percent (GAT,  1994). However,  the extent to which
developing  countries  choose  to use tariff  bindings,  and the resulting  patterns  of liberalization  varied
considerably  by commodity  and by country.  Some countries used the Round to lock in and
consolidate  recent unilateral and/or bilateral liberalizations  while others, particularly the least-
developed  ones, made no substantial liberalization  commitments. Developing  countries were
allowed  to offer tariff ceiling  bindings  (arbitrarily  chosen maximum  levels)  in commodities  with
previous  unbound  tariffs, and were  required  to commit  lower  reduction  obligations  (two-thirds  the
level in industrial countries) to  be implemented  over a  longer transition period (ten years).
Agricultural  subsidies  for food  security,  investment,  input, transport  and marketing  were  exempted
1'rom  reductions.  In addition,  the most prevalent  trade distortions  in developing  countries,  namely
import  subsidies,  export  taxes,  state-trading  import  monopolies  are not disciplined  in the Round.
Latin  America
Most  countries  in IhC  rcgion  began  unilateral  trade reforms  in the late 1980s  or early 1990s
andl  have overtaken  (he UR process in reducing  tariffs and NTBs. Tarifl' reductions  have been
signiticant  in Argentina.  Brazil. Chile, Colombia. Mexico,  Peru. and Venezuela  since the mid-
I1980s.'  Thesc countries  consolidated  recent  liberalization  in the UR and have tariffied  remaining
'In addition, there has been increased Iree-trade arrangements among countries in the region. for instance, in the
southem conie commoni  market  (MERCOSUR). and(  Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
34NTBs in several commodities.  A number of countries (e.g. Brazil) have also offered additional
reductions in protection on several commodities. However, some countries have set their post-UR
bound rates above current applied rates, potentially resulting in increased applied border protection
after the Round.  For instance, Colombia established bound tariffs which are significantly higher
than historical protection levels for durum wheat (124 percent), barley (144 percent), maize (194
percent), sorghum (132 percent), soybeans (125 percent) and sugar (117 percent).  The average
tariff equivalent of nominal border protection for these commodities ranged between 3-20 percent
in 1982-92.  In contrast. Venezuela committed tariff bindings which are significantly lower than
those applying in the base period for  the commodities considered, while Chile appears  to have
committed final bindings at or below the previous bound rates. 2
In  Mexico, price  support  and  import  controls and  licensing have  afforded producers
significant protection in most commodities, particularly in  maize,  wheat. barley,  sorghum and
soybeans.  The post-UR tariff equivalents indicate reduced protection in maize and soybeans but
increased protection in barley,  rice and  durum wheat.  In commodities with no  pre-UR  tariff
bindings, the post-UR bound rates  in some countries are sometimes higher than  the initial base
tariffs (i.e. applied rates in September  1986).  In Brazil and Uruguay, for instance,  the bound
tariff for beef and veal is set at 55 percent, compared with a base tariff of 25 percent.  Quantitative
restrictions on imports dominated by export taxation characterized Brazil's trade regime prior to
1993, indicated by the negative pre-UR tariff equivalents in most commodities. The average tariff
was reduced from 32 percent in 1990 to about 14 percent in 1993, with a maximum tariff set at 35
percent.  The post-UR tariff bindings in Brazil and Uruguay indicate an increase in the maximum
tariff from 35 percent to 55 percent.
2 Chile sets an annual price-hand to protect wheat, sugar, and vegetable oils from imports.  Domestic prices are
maintainecl within the hand hy either adding an additional tariff to the uniform tariff level or by lowering the uniform
tariff . Chile's uniform import tariff since June 1991 is I  percent, with preferential rates set for member countries of
ALADI (Latin American Integration Association).
35Other  Latin  American  countries  committed nearly  uniform  tariff  bindings  in  most
agricultural  commodities: Bolivia (40 percent), Paraguay  (35  percent), Honduras  (35 percent),
Dominican Republic (40 percent),  Peru (30 percent, except in wheat, milk, and butter set at  68
percent).
Asia
The extent of agricultural liberalization in Asian countries as a  result of the  UR varied
among commodities and countries.  In general, however, the reductions in border protection as a
result of the UR will be modest in many commodities in Asian countries.  The results indicate that
several countries in Upper-Income Asia committed to  further reduce border protection int some
major commodities while others, particularly South Asian countries, will not liberalize agriculture
under the Round.  On the contrary, the Round may potentially increase protection in agriculture if
applied rates are increased from current levels towards bound levels.  The tariff commitments in
low-income Asian countries do not represent any meaningful liberalizations and are unlikely to
address tdie  key distortions in trade policies.
Most countries in the region, as in other least-developed regions, were given the flexibility
to establish general or specitic tariff bindings (which defines maximum protection levels over the
next ten years) at lcvels signilicantly above historical protection rates.  In some countries, the effect
ol the high tarill:s on domestic resource allocation are neutralized by government controlled prices.
whichi  in many caIsCs  IIrC  kept helow world prices.  This negative protection or taxation in some
countries were not disciplined in the Round.
Most least-develoied cotintries in Asia were able to bind their tarilts at a maximum level
(ceiling binding) or reduce already bound rates,  whicih in many cases were above the  current
applied rates.  Several countries introduced ceilino tariff bindings at levels tar above the pre-UR
36levels  of protection. For instance,  the ceiling  bindings  in most commodities  were set at very high
levels in Bangladesh  (200 percent ), Pakistan (100-150 percent), India (100-150 percent) and
Myanmar (168 percent).  India has bound most agricultural  tariffs at prohibitive  levels.  For
instance, the UR base protection  for sugar was set at 75 percent, meats and tree crops at 140
percent, and dairy products at 45 percent. Wheat, which was taxed at -13 percent in 1982-93,
received  a tariff binding  of 100 percent,  while  oilseeds,  cotton, tobacco, and jute received  a tariff
binding  at 100 percent. For other food grains (corn, rice and sorghum),  protection  rates shifted
from small positive  levels  in 1986-88  to negative  levels since 1989,  as hikes in world  prices were
not transmitted  to domestic  producers. Interestingly,  the post-UR  tariffs for these commodities
were bound  to zero. This implies  that the Indian  state trading  import  monopolies  in these  products
cannot  maintain  internal  prices  above  world  prices  during  the implementation  period.
Agricultural  protection  in the Republic  of Korea has historically  been achieved  through
import  bans, quotas and tariffs,  state trading  and producer  price supports. The pre-UR  protection
was particularly high for major crops and livestock  products.  For instance, the average tariff
equivalent  of border  measures  in 1982-92  was very  high  in wheat  (272 percent),  rice (232 percent),
coarse grains (327 percent),  sugar (139 percent),  meat (186 percent), oilseeds  (338 percent) and
dairy products (118 percent). Relative  to the average  tariff equivalents  in 1982-92,  the final UR
tarifl equivalents  indicate significant  reduction in allowable  protection  in beef and veal (-144
percent), pork (-29.8 percent), poultry (-17 percent), and eggs (-21 percent), but  increased
allowable protection in milk (57.6 percent) ,  barley (73 percent), corn (132.6 percent), and
soybeans  (149.2  percent)  compared  with the average  protection  in 1989-92  and 1982-92.
Similar  patterns  are observed  in Indonesia,  where  a comparison  of pre- and post-UR  tariff
equivalents  indicate  very high bindings  in corn (65.5 percent),  rice (171 percent),  and sugar (23.3
percent),  but reduced  protection  in soybeans  (47.2  percent).
37Africa and the Middle East
Most African countries have taxed agriculture either explicitly, for example, by controlling
domestic prices below world prices, or implicitly by  giving higher protection to industry.  The
pattern  of  taxation varied by  commodity, but African countries have traditionally  given more
protection to food crop producers than cash crop producers, who are often taxed.  In Nigeria, Ior
example, food crops were heavily protected with average nominal protection in 1982-92 largest in
corn (452 percent), wheat (190 percent), rice (137.2 percent) and sugar (29.4 percent).  In contrast,
coffee and cocoa producers were taxed during the same period.  In Senegal, soybeans, rice. and
sorghum producers received signilicant protection in the 1980s, while peanut producers wcre ol'ten
taxed.
Trade  policy  ref'orms during  the  1980s centered  on  removal  ol' quotas  or  licensing
restrictions  and changes in the tarilf  structure.  Export  promotion policies include reduction of'
export taxes and quotas, exchange rate relorms, allowance for duty-l'ree imports lor exporters, and
introduction of'export subsidies.  On average, producers were taxed in  the early 1980s.  In Egypt,
Nigeria, and Tanzania, these taxes were quite high.  In more recent years, taxes have declined and
in some cases, subsidies have replaced taxes.  For example, Nigeria's sugar and cotton producers
were taxed until 1985.  Since then, these sectors have received positive protection. ranging Irom 20
percent-5(  percent.  In contrast, protection in the lood crop sector has declined during the  1)980s,
I'ollowing  the unilateral trade policy relorms.  Nigeria's average protection on tile rice sector.  fIor
example, declined from more than 217 percent in 1982-85  to about 3 percent in  1989-92.
Participating Atrican countries have bound 100 percent ol' thei  tarif'f' lines in agriculture,
with  most  countries  committed to  have  uniform  taril'f' ceiling  bindings  in  all  agricultural
commodities in lieu ol' reduction commitments.  However. the level ol' the laril'l' bindings in most
countries  is  at  prohibitive  levels (100-30() percent),  and  is  set  way  above  pre-UR  levels  ol'
38protection  in most food  crops. The highest  levels  of uniform  ceiling  bindings  are in Nigeria  (230
percent), Senegal (180 percent), Zimbabwe  (150 percent), Kenya (100 percent), Cameroon (80
percent)  and Gabon (60 percent). In contrast,  relatively  lower uniform  tariff ceiling  bindings  (less
than 50 percent)  for all agricultural  commodities  were committed  by other  countries  such as Congo
(30 percent), Madagascar  (30 percent)  and by the South African  Customs  Union (South Africa,
Swaziland,  and Namibia). In South Africa,  duties  will  decline  by more  than  40 percent  on average,
from more  than 70 percent  to 40 percent  over six years. Very few  of the African  countries  offered
reduction in their ceiling bindings, with only Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, and Zimbabwe offering
minimum  reduction on several commodities. In some countries with previously  bound tariffs,
reduction  commitments  were made  on their  previous  bound  rates. but other  duties  and charges  are
then added.  For example,  the bound tariff for fluid milk in Cote d'lvoire was reduced from 7
percent  to 6 percent,  but a 200 percent  was added  for other  duties  and charges. Other  countries  did
not offer to cut previous  bindings,  with additional  duties  and charges  listed  in their schedules.' If
these  other  duties  and charges  are applied,  the result will  be a substantial  increase  in protection  on
these products.  Other countries,  such as Tunisia established  tariff bindings in the range of 90
percent to  190 percent.  As in  other developing  countries, these ceiling bindings define the
maximum  allowable  protection  in agriculture  during  the post-UR  period. In the case of cash crops,
where  the pre-UR trade policy  regime  effectively  taxed the sector, the UR did not provide  direct
disciplines.
In North Africa  and the Middle  East, some countries  have moved  from taxing agriculture
to subsidizing  the sector  since  the mid-1980s.  Most countries  have  restricted  imports  through  non-
tariff barriers such import bans and quotas, import  licenses,  state monopolies,  and other similar
3  The other duties ancl charges listed in the schedules as part of the new bindings should be equivalent to the actual
applied rates in April 15, 1994 (Article 11:1  (b)).  Trading partners can challenge these rates during a three-year
period af ter the enforcement of the commitment or the entry into force of the WTO.  The other duties and charges
were added to the post-Uruguay Round tariff bindings estimate in African countries.
39measures.  Most countries promote self-sufficiency policies tor major staple loods suchi as wheat,
barley and meats by administered prices, state monopolies and restrictions on imports.  In recent
years, many countries have been moving towards liberalization and reducing input and consumer
subsidies.  With  few exceptions (e.g. Egypt), most countries in the region,  however, did not
commit to further liberalization in most of agricultural commodities in the Round.  Most countries
will continue to protect and support the domestic production of wheat, coarse grains, sugar,  and
meat by the end of the UR implementation period.
In Morocco, tor instance, while some steps have been taken toward liberalization in recent
years, the UR commitments indicate no or very little liberalization in most commodities.  Recent
reforms to liberalize trade  include the removal of a  l'ew import restrictions and  liberalizing the
exchange rate.  Also,  producer prices ior major grains suchi as durum wheat, barley, and corn
were removed since 1990.  However, impport  licenses have been maintained f-or  many commodities
and state-trading enterprise continue to monopolize imports ol' grains, vegetable oils, sugar,  and
other commodities.  Most commondities  were alternately taxed or protected at low rates during the
pre-UR period.  For instance. over 1982-89, wheat was alternately subsidized or taxed.  The taxes
peaked at nearly 8 percent, while protection peaked at more than  12 percent. In 1989, when haid
wheat was liberalized, the level ol' protection dropped substantially.  Sugar was taxed during most
ol' the period, except  in  1984-85 when wotid prices f'ell substantially and currency devaluation
yielded positive protection.  Sugar protection declined from a high ol' 46  percent in  1984 to 32
percent in 1989 as the wedge between of'licial producer prices and the f:arimigale  hor-der  equivalent
price narrowed.  In recent years, she average import tariff for all agricultural coimInodities  is below
25  percent, with a  low tarill' (2.5 percent) imposed on  grains, and  a high taril'l' of' 45  percent
charged on imports ol' meat and dairy products to encourage domestic production.  In addition to
the customs tarit'l', an additional ad-valorem tax  rate ol'  15 percent, as  well as  other  1ees are
40charged on  all imports.  In the UR, Morocco established tariff equivalents  which provide
potentially  higher  rate of protection  for most agricultural  products. The bound  tariffs submitted  by
Morocco were substantially  higher  than the actual tariff equivalent  rates during the base period.
Although  these tariffs are to be reduced by 24 percent,  most commodities  could receive higher
protection  rates at the end of the UR implementation  period  relative  to the pre-UR  period. In the
case of wheat, for instance, the bound tariff was set at 190 percent for durum wheat in 1995
declining  to 144 percent in 2004, which  is still higher  than the estimated  tariff equivalent  at 130
percent in 1986-88. Other commodities  also obtained significantly  higher tariff bindings  in the
Round, resulting  in no liberalization  after the implementation  period. For instance,  the level of
trade weighted  average  post-UR  tariffied  protection  is highest  in beef  and veal (239 percent),  lamb
and mutton (289 percent), poultry (101 percent),  sugar (168 percent), rice (177 percent), and
oilseeds  (215 percent). In contrast,  the bound  tariffs  on fruits and vegetables  were set at relatively
low levels  (34 percent).
Given the range of applicable  modalities  in establishing  the final concessions,  it appears
that participating  countries chose the most politically  feasible for each commodity. Political
considerations  involved  domestic conditions  as well as the position  that could be sustained in
bilateral concessions  given that a  country was also negotiating  to obtain access and lowest
protection  applied  on their exports.
In general,  most developing  countries  committed  a general  ceiling  binding  in less traded or
less important commodities  subject to  unbound duties.  For these commodities,  developing
countries  have  the flexibility  in the future  to raise protection  to some extent if desired,  as current
applied rates are generally  lower than the final ceiling  binding. For politically  sensitive  products
subject to unbound  tariffs at the beginning  of the Round, most developing  countries  offered a
specific  ceiling  binding,  which  also provided  potential  increased  protection  in these  commodities  in
41the future.  The results indicate that tariffication provided countries the opportunity to raise tariffs
that were already bound at the beginning of the Round and raise tariff bindings above applied rates
or, in the case of the industrial countries, raise previously bound and/or applied taril'fs whether or
not they were bound.
The high levels of tariff bindings resulting from the Round may have adverse effects on
developing country agriculture.  First, the outcome indicates that the Round may not result in much
agricultural  liberalization  in  practice  in  most  developing countries,  and  may  actually  raise
protection  in  some  cases  if  the  tariff  bindings  are  actually  applied.  While  the  actual
implementation remains uncertain, the high level of bindings provide a  negative signal toward
liberalization.  The new transparency in import protection, while a signilicant rel'orm, was achieved
at the expense of real reductions in trade distortions.  Second, the high level of tariff coimmitments
may undermine the initial objective to remove non-tarilf barriers such as variable levies. Countries
can still impose tariffs at varying rates below the margin ol the binding, wilicil could be tied to a
domestic controlled priice. The taril'f can be set as the difl'erence between the domestic price and
the world price as long as the applied taril'f is below the bound rate.  In practice, (his may operate
similarly to a variable levy, which is illegal under GATT.  Third, thie  high level ol' taril'l' bindings
may allow countries to apply varying tarif'l'rates within the bound rates, thus weakening the goal to
stabilize and make protection transparent.  In addition, most ol' the bound rates are set too higih  to
provide an etl'cctivc cap to f:acilitate  security of market access.
6.  How Much Agricultural Liberalization  Was Achieved in the Uruguay Round?
As indicated above,  any evaluation of' the  liberalizing ef'l'ect ol' the  Round requires an
assessment  of the protective el'fiects  ot' the measures which preceded it and  whicih would have
occurred without it.  Had the UR not concluded, then presumably these policies, or some variant of'
42them, would have generated the counterfactual rate of protection against which the UR should be
evaluated.  To measure the extent of liberalization,  the estimated post-UR border protection is
compared with two hypothesized counterfactual rate of future protection without the Round.  The
first is based on  the average of the longest available sample,  1982-93.  This is based  on the
argument that border protection in agriculture is inherently unstable, reflecting variations in world
prices  and stable (politically fixed) internal prices.  This also  assumes that there  has been  no
underlying upward trend in the level of protection and that the distribution of protection during
1995-2000 would be the same as in the historical sample.  The second baseline is based on the
average protection in recent years (1989-93).  This is based on the argument that the recent decade
has  seen structural  shifts in trade  policies with many developing countries and  some industrial
countries undergoing unilateral and/or bilateral reforms, while others, particularly most industrial
countries, have shown the tendency to maintain or increase protection in agriculture.
The use of the average protection over the the longest sample rather than more recent or
current  levels  as  a  counterfactual  has  important  implications for  the  liberalization  estimates
depending on whetller the long-term average is above or below the current levels of protection.  In
oeneral, in countries where protection levels have increased over time, such as in several OECD
countries (e.g. EU, Japan and EFTA) and some East Asian developing countries (e.g. Republic of
Korea). the long-run average protection is below more recent levels.  Hence, lower estimates of
liberalization  may result  when  the long-run average is  compared with the phased-in  post-UR
protection levels, than  when a more recent average is used as benchmark.  Also, the actual ad-
valorem  equivalents of  the post-UR  specific tariffs  will be  influenced by  future  world  price
clhanges. The estimates presented in this section are based on current World Bank world price
projections.
43Annual  estimates  of  post-UR  border  protection  for  the  period  1996  to  2002  are
constructed  using  the  benchmark and  final offers  and  interpolating over  the  phase-in period,
assumning  equal annual reduction. 4 Liberalization is recorded only in those cases where the bound
rate is below the benchmark rate ol' protection, otherwise no change is assumed. To provide useful
information for modeling and to ftacilitate  turther quantitative evaluation ol' the impact ol' the UR,
the estimated results on individual countries discussed above are aggregated to corr-espond  to the
commodity and regional aggregation of the RUNS model developed by the OECD and thc World
Bank.  The regional andi commodity detinitions follow the current version ol' the RUNS mondel
described in Goldin, Knudsen, and van der Mensbrugghe (1993) and documented coinprelhensively
in Burniaux and van der Mensbrugghe (1991).
Tables 6a and 6b show the associated price reductions for imnports  ot' major-  comimodities
in 2002 (estimated as change in the protection rate divided by one plus (he  initial protection rate) as
a result of the changes in protection relative to the baseline levels based on the long-run average
and the average in recent years.  A zero reduction indicates that the benclhm-ark  protection rate is
below the bound rate lor all components ol' the aggregate.
The results indicate that regardless ol' the assuniption on the rate ol' prolection without the
UR, very little or no liberalization appears to be acihieved  I'or most comimiThOdities  in most  countries
(Table 6a and 6b).  For most industrial countries, the extent ol' trade liberalization in agriculture as
a result ot the Round appears to be modest, and the estimated rate ol' protection in 20)02  remains
above the benchmark protection rates  in most commodities.  An imiiportant  exception is Japan,
4The  phase-in period  is betweeni 1995 to 2000 for industrial  countrieis and(  between 1  1995-200)4  lor  dcvelolpilig
countries.  For the RUNS  mo(lel. which  require simulations  through  2002. the horder protection  in industrial
countries  are maintained  at their  final  levels in 2000.
5 This method  do not consi(ler  reductionis  in averagc  protectioni  rates  as  a result ol thc inltro(IluCtion  oftan  IT  hindlings
above current applihed rates.  However,  it overestimates the inarginal  reluctioll  il  proteclioin dlue  a binding  which
reduces protection  helow  the historical  average levels (Martin  and(  Franicois. 1994).  FoI future work.  differenll
henchmarks and alternative  approximations  ol the distribution  ol luture  protectioin givcn  the new ta_riff  indings
hased on the methodlology developecd  hy Martin  ancl Francois ( 1994) will  hc use(l.
44where a significant reduction in protection relative to the baseline levels is estimated in two major
imported grains, wheat and coarse grains.  Japan  established very large reductions, although the
final tariff levels remain relatively high.  Relative to long-run average. protection in wheat declines
from 308 percent to 193 percent, and coarse grains from 336 percent to 180 percent.  Most of the
OECD countries show very little or no liberalization in highly protected commodities such as sugar
and dairy products.  In contrast, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables, which had low rates of protection
in the pre-UR period showed further reductions as a result of the Round.
In the United States,  the tariff  equivalent on  wheat will decline from  13 percent to  4
percent, on wool from 8 percent to 4 percent, on cotton from 31 percent to 21 percent, and other
non-food items from 19 percent to 7 percent.  Post-UR protection levels of highly protected sectors
such as dairy and sugar remain above the baseline levels.  Likewise, virtually no liberalization is
recorded in Canada, with sugar, poultry, and dairy sectors remaining highly protected.  Australia
and New Zealand have the lowest protection levels among the OECD countries. Further reductions
were established in the  Uruguay Round, with most sectors having protection below  2  percent
except dairy at 7 percent, coffee at 6 percent, and non-foods at  23 percent.  Sugar in Australia
remains protected in 2002 at 20 percent.
Similarly,  little or  no  liberalization  is  estimated in  the  European  Union and  EFTA
countries by 2002.  In the European Union, the only sector where protection is slightly reduced
from baseline levels (based on the long-run average) is beef, with protection declining from 97
percent  to  83  percent  in  2002.  Very  slight  reductions  are  estimated in  other  agricultural
commodities.  In EFTA, border protection in sugar is estimated to decline from 205 percent to 187
percent and in other foods from 52 percent to 25 percent.
In  the case  of most  least-developed countries, where  the tariff  ceiling  bindings  were
significantly higher than the historical rate of protection, no liberalization is considered to occur.
45This is true in the case of  South Asia (Low Income Asia) and Sub-Saharan Atrica, where most
countries committed only to very high tariff ceiling bindings.  Relative to the benchmark levels of
protection, no liberalization is estimated to occur in most Low Income Asian countries, including
China under the UR.  This is because these countries have generally taxed, rather than protected
agriculture. Most of these countries established very high tariff  ceiling bindings in the Uruguay
Round.
Among other developing countries, the largest reduction in border protection relative to the
long-run average benchmark levels is estimated in Upper Income Asia.  Significant liberalization
appears  to be achieved in wheat. coarse grains, meats, and other non-food (mainly tobacco and
jute).  Relative to Ihe long-run average, protection in wheat will decline from 272 percent to  13
percent in 2002, while protection in coarse grains will signiificantly  reduced from 327 percent to 95
percent.  This  results  in significant price  reductions  for  imports of wheat  and  coarse grains,
respectively.  Rice in the Republic ot' Korea and the Philippines is exempted from tariffication
under "Special Treatment" provisions.  Upper income Asia will maintain protection of 50 percent
on  its traditional staples.  Protection in meats is substantially reduced relative to  the long-run
avera-e,  but  there  is  very  little change on  dairy, oilseeds, and  other  foods.  In general.  the
agricultural  sector  in  East  Asia  remains  relatively protected.  with  taril'f' equivalents ranging
between 40  percent  to  1()( percent.  In India. whiclh has  negative protection in  most  -rain
produclion, but  provides positive protection in oilseeds (e.g. groundnuts)  and  tree crops  (e.g
copra),  no liheralization is achiieved  in most products.  In Indonesia. border protection on oilseeds
will decline 1rom  77 percent to 27 percent in 20().
As  slhown above.  m(ost countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Alrica  generally  tax  aericultural
production in aggregate.  Given the maximum ceiling bindin_s establislhed in the UR,  no major
changes in policies and trade liberalization are estimate(d  in this region.  Ni_eria, on the other lhand,
46provides  significant  protection  in major  grains,  such as wheat  and coarse  grains. Border  protection
in wheat  is estimated  to decline  by 40 percentage  points  in 2002 (from 190  percent  to 150  percent),
and coarse  grains by more  than 300 percentage  points (from  452 percent  to 150  percent)  relative  to
the long-run  average.  No liberalization  is recorded  in the Mediterranean  and Gulf countries. In
South Africa, tariffs are relatively  low, and they have established  relatively  little change in post-
UR protection  levels  (most reductions  in the range  of less than 5 percent in absolute  terms). The
most significant  change  is in non-food  agricultural  products  from 69 percent  to 50 percent  in 2002.
Very little change  in protection  is estimated  for the Latin American  region. The largest
reduction  is in cocoa where  a 20 percent  decline  in protection  is estimated  in 2002 relative  to the
long-run average.  Brazil will reduce border protection slightly in wheat, but  otherwise,  no
liberalization  in other commodities  is estimated. Similarly,  Mexico  will only reduce  protection  in
poultry  and pork (other  meat),  but not change  protection  in the important  grain sectors.
47Table  6a. ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE IMPORT PRICE REDUtC'rIONS  FROM LONG-RUN  AVERAGE,  1972-93.  1
COUNTRY/REGION  WIIEAT  kICE  COARSE  SUGAR  MEAT  OILsEEIDS  DAIRY
GRAINS
EUROPEAN  UNION  0%  (%  0%  n0%  -9%  0%  I%
UNITED  STATES  -9%  0%  0%  0e4%  0%k  0%){'l  -8%
JAPAN  -47%  -55%  -35%  6%  0%  0%
AUSTRALIA  -1%  -9%  0%  0%  0%  -1%  -16%
CANADA  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
EFTA  0  %  -8%  0%  -11%  0%  0%  0%
UPPER  INCOME  ASIA  -109%  0%  -78%  -7%  -33%  -3%  0%
INDt)NESIA  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  -33%  0%
INDIA  0M.  0%  0%  0%  0%  -18%  0%
LOW-[NCOME  ASIA  0%70  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
BRA7.L  -7%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
MEXICO  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%7l  0%
OTIIER LATIN  AMERICA  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
NIGIRIA  -15%  0%  -75%  0%  0%  0%  0%
MEDrITERRANEAN  0'%  0%  0%  0  %  0%  0%fl,  0%
OT(I'ER  AFRICA  0%7c  0  %  0%  0%  0%  0%  0  %
SOU()t  AFRICA  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
MAGiIIREB  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%7  0%  0%
'ITatble6b.  EVI'IMATE.S  OFAVERA(:E  IMNloRT  P'RICE  REDUCTIONS  FROM RECENT  lERIOD  AVERA:E,  19it9-93 1/
CU)IINTRY/RE(:IO1N  WIIEAT  RICE  CO(ARSE  SUGAR  MEA'r  OILSEFDS  DAIRY
GRAINS
UROPIEAN  IUNION  U";  0%  0%  °%  -123  O%
I NI  I  N  )  S-rAil  '  - 1')  'ST  '  "'  I  11%  %0  0 %
JAI'AN  -XI %  -91%7.  -47%  333  11%  -143
Al IST'RAIIA  0%  4%  ''%  0%  0%  -1Y%  -19%7.
'ANAl)A  (1%rn  0%  (i%  f0i  0%7.  (I%  0'.
I  |  U A  '.'%  0%  -1%  -14%  10%  -I8%  0%
ITl'P'I:R  INCOME  ASIA  -164%  0%7°  -767  -7%  _44%  -A5%  0%
INDONESIA  n;  0%.  0%  n"  0%lp  -33%  0%
IN!)IA  I'l  0%  0%  0%  0/  33  0 %
I.OWAV-INCOME,  ASIA  04  %  0lr  0;  0%  0h  0%
RItA:/II.  -3';  10%  0%  ('o  *'  0  0%
MI XI(  AI)  )'s  0%  1%  '.4  0%  -1'S  0%
T'l  Il  . IATIN AMI. RI('A  r'S  °'  0'  1fil  lh  ,  03
NI(;i1RIA  -12.  I  -16%  D'S  el.0
NII)l'll.RRANEAN  c'  o0%  S  0%  ''.4  cl'S  0%
(TIIII'  AFRI('A  "';  c"'  0%  c,'  0%  c3  0%
SO! 'TH AlVRU  'A  c';  '  c
t;  cr  cc:;  cc's  0%
MA(R111  olt  o  ';  cc;s  cc's  0%  3%  '''S  0%
1/ ENst  ici  til  e]as  It(I)-ItI))W(  I  +(  (.5*lIII)+iIh)))
Meit illalle;IIii  inCludLs  (N-pro1s.  I r:zyp1.  Israel. .J'Irdan  II.e  laoinA  I  .ihlya. Mltai.  Syria. antl 'I'turkey.
NlI lllrrelilIC  ideLLs  iAierfi;a,  Mi  oLroci.  aI  liiiiis  a.
Soucie: Author's iaculti  ations:hcrsic  dLat iae I'onlii  lruguray  ROld  ilCountrIIt.y  sCheduLIles.
487.  Implications
Given the hiigh  level of initial tariffs.  the quantitative implications of tariftication on
trade flows and prices will not be significant in the next several years.  In countries where there
were pre-UR price-related border measures such as variable levies and minimum impor  t prices.
the UR  tariffication  process  may  not have  a  significant effect  since these countries have
established tariff bindings which are significantly above the current levels ot' protection and
could apply variable tariffs which have similar distortionary effects.
The intended benefits of tariffication would also be undermined if countries resort to
safeguard protection, which according to Finger (1994). has become easier to use as a result of'
the Round.  The estimation of border protection in this paper does not account for the impact
of the Special Safeguards (SSP) provisions.  Given the trigger levels involved. the SSP could
limit the effectiveness of tariffication.  In addition, the price trigger conditions under the SSP
are related to individual shipments and may introduce certain elements of discrimination. In
some cases,  countries may not use the maximum level of tariffs specified in their Schedules
and could adjust their below-commitment levels of tariffs depending on  world market price
fluctuations before reaching the limits specified in the Special Saleguard Provisions ol' Article
5.  Also, countries are able to pursue policies whicih  are half-way between tariffs and variable
levies under the Special Safeguard provisions.
The  results  indicate  most  countries  were  able  to  satist'y the  guidelines  lor  an
unweighted average reduction of tariffs by 36 percent by reducing the highlest  tarif'fs:  the least
and lowest tariffs reduced the most or to zero.  For instance, sugar  has the highest pre-UR
protection in the EU (234 percent in 1986-88) and in the United States (131 percent in 1986-
88) among the commodities considered.  The United States committed to reduce protection in
sugar by  15 percent in 2000  from its declared base. while the EU committed less than  the
49required minimum reduction (6 percent).  In contrast, the United States committed a full 36
percent reduction in protection for wheat, rice and poultry -- commodities  with relatively small
pre-UR protection.
Hence, the approach in achieving the required unweighted average reduction in tariffs
allows  differential treatment  of  commodities. It  was  possible for  a  country  to  meet the
aggregate reduction of 36 percent by reducing tariffs of important and "sensitive" commodities
by the minimum required reduction of 15 percent and reducing or eliminating tariffs of  less
important commodities.  The use  of unweighted overall average reductions of tariffs have
resulted in continued high protection  in some key commodities.
The  combination  of  "dirty"  tariffication  and  the  unequal  distribution  of  tariff
reductions for many commodities previously protected by NTBs have allowed for continued
higlh protection at  the end  of the implementation period.  The combination also  resulted in
unequal rates  of' protection across commodities in certain countries.  This  is shown in the
increased dispersion ol' protection between  the highly protected products and those with already
low  levels of' prolection.  For example,  the  results  indicate that  the  bindings  for  border
protection lor sugar and dairy products were maintained or even increased in some countries,
whereas protection on pro(iucts sticil as coffee. cocoa. oilseeds was generally reduced from an
already low level.  In this case, the approacih  ol' tarifl' reductions employed may lead to even
miore  distortions in aigricultural  trade in somile  cases.
According lo  the  Modalities, "current  access opportunities.... shall he  maintained and
increase(d  over the iimpleeilntlaition  period."  and countries were required to specily their current
access comimitimienis  in their Schiedules.  In cases where voluntary export restraints existed. the
coUntry SchC(uIles  appear to include Ihe respective quantities  in tlie current access tables.  In elfect.
VERs were turned inito  tarifft'  quolas. witli quotas allocaled to the same exportino countries as
50under the former VERs.  This implies that there would be no significant economic effects initially
since  the  quantities  which  can  be  shipped to  the  importing country  under  the  former  price
structures remain limited by a quota, also the exporting country would still obtain the quota rents.
In addition, internal prices may change, affecting the amount of rent.  However, in contrast to
VERs, the importer would not be allowed to reduce the tariff quota, giving suppliers much greater
market security.
8.  Summary and Conclusions
The  effective exemption of  agriculture  from GATT  disciplines has  facilitated  an
agricultural  policy  in  OECD  countries  characterized  by  strong  protection  of  domestic
producers  by  means  of  trade  restrictions  and  direct  price  support.  In  contrast,  many
developing  countries  have  effectively taxed  agriculture  by  means  of  export  taxes  and
overvalued exchange rates.  During the 1980s, while many developing countries came under
heavy external pressure to liberalize trade, most industrial countries increased protection in
agriculture.  When the Uruguay Round began in the mid-1980s, the gap between domestic and
world  prices  of  agricultural products  in  OECD  as  a  whole averaged  nearly  80  percent,
compared to 41  percent in 1979-81.  By 1992, the nominal protection coefficient for OECD
agriculture remained at very high levels, estimated at about 74 percent.
The Uruguay Round sought to "halt and reverse agricultural protectionism and remove
trade distortions" (1986 Punta del Este declaration).  The agreement on agriculture established
new international rules and  imposed constraints on border protection, export  subsidies and
domestic  support.  Participating  countries  were  required  to  (i)  remove  and  convert  all
quantitative restrictions into tariffls and reduce border protection (from  1986-88 level) by at
least 36 percent over six years and provide minimum access opportunities (at least 3-5 percent
51of domestic consumption) in products  previously subject to  non-tariff barriers;  (ii) reduce
export subsidies by  36  percent in  value and  21  percent in volume; and  (iii) reduce trade
distorting aggregate domestic subsidies by  20 percent.  The obligations were differentiated
according  to  level of development.  Developing countries were  allowed to  offer  "ceiling
bindings" (i.e.,  arbitrarily  chosen maximum tariff level), and were required to  apply lower
reduction obligations (two-thiirds  of the level in industrial countries) to be implemented over a
longer transition period (ten years).  Subsidies for  food security, as well as for investment,
input, transport,  and  marketing were exempt from reductions.  In addition, least-developed
countries were exempt from reduction commitments.
In this paper, I argue that while significant reforms in the rules were achieved, the
extent  of  liberalization  and  tile  degree  of  reduction  in  agricultural  protection  will  be
signilicantly less tilan expected.  Based on extensive examination of the country schedules of
linal commitments and estimates ot pre- and post-UR ad-valorem tariff equivalents of border
measures, the analysis indicates that the  specific and ad-valorem tariffs  equivalents which
many counlries hiave set in  ilheir  Schedules are significantly higiler than the wedge between
actual domiiestic  and world prices in the base period, hience  providing highler protection than
was prevaiiling  in  196-88.  Thus.  the extent ol' liberalization as a result ol' the Round was
ero(led since the post-UR taril'l' equivalents (aid-voloreni) in major commondities  were set at
levels higiler than the border protection they replaced.  More importantly. the wide occurrence
of "dirty" tarit'lication in the OECD countries resulted in very little or no liberalization in major
agricultural coimmoidities.  Where larill' reductions would have had the most si-nilicant  effect
on traide. counitries opted  lor minimum reductions.  Relative to average protection levels in
recent years and tile average during the last ten to 1if'teen  years. the post-UR base and  tinal
laril'fequivalents  and hindings  al-c  significantly higher in most countries.
52The analysis of bindings on tariffied agricultural protection in the industrial countries
indicate that  the degree of liberalization achieved was modest in  most commodities.  An
exception is Japan,  where significant reductions in protection were achieved from very high
historical levels.  In other OECD countries, the UR results indicate that protection in the EU
would increase substantially for a number of commodities  if domestic prices are raised by the
end  of  the  implementation period  to  the  levels  indicated by  the  EU's  ad-valorem tariff
equivalents.  If the EU applies the maximum specific tariffs in the Schedules, the estimated
post-UR  ad-valorem tariff  equivalents in  1995  indicate  significant potential  increases  in
protection in major commodities relative to recent levels and relative to the average protection
in 1979-93.
For developing countries, the UR negotiations provided the opportunity to increase
their integration into the international trading system. Several developing countries in East and
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Middle East reduced protection in some commodities and
chose to lock in previous unilateral reforms.  However, most countries in Africa (except South
Africa) and South Asia did not use the Round to consolidate domestic efforts at trade reform,
with many countries making no substantial liberalization commitments on border protection.
In general, the agricultural agreement left many developing country distortions outside of its
discipline, such as state-trading monopolies and policies that tax agriculture either explicitly by
taxing exports or by maintaining domestic prices below world prices or implicitly by providing
higher protection to industry.  There is no additional provision to enhance transparency in the
belhavior  of state trading enterprises for either importing or exporting through these agencies.
This will likely be an important area of trade distortion for developing countries, not only for
present participants  but also for those seeking membership to the WTO, particularly China,
and  the countries  of the  former Soviet Union where  state  trading still  dominate trade  in
agriculture.  The lack of effective control over the  actions of state-trading  monopolies or
effective discipline on resale prices weakens or eliminates the effects of lower tariffs.  In a few
cascs, bilateral  agreements provide bindings on mark-ups on resale prices as in the case of
53Japan.  However, given the high level of tariff bindings, state trading monopolies will remain
largely undisciplined in most countries.  In addition, the general exemptions based on balance
of payments difficulties remain available for countries to use to maintain trade distortions.
The  extent  to  which  developing countries  choose to  use  tariff  bindings,  and  the
resulting patterns  of liberalization varied considerably by  commodity and by  country.  In
general, most developing countries committed a general ceiling binding in less traded or less
important  commodities subject  to  unbound  duties.  For  these  commodities,  developing
countries have the flexibility in the future to raise protection, as current applied rates are way
below the final ceiling bindings.  For economically and politically sensitive prodlucis  subject to
unbound tariffs  at  the  beginning of the Round, most developing countries ol''fered specific
ceiling bindings, which also provides potential increased protection in these coimmodities  in the
future.  The results indicate that tariflication provided countries the opportunity to raise tariffs
that were already bound at the beginning of the Round or in the case ol' the industrial countries,
raise bound and/or applied tarifl:s  whether or not they were bound.
The results suggest that taril'fication will not likely have a significant el'lect on  trade
flows and prices in the next several years.  The high levels of larillied protection in agriculture.
combined with exemptions ol' important domestic support  measures, will continue to  limil
access to major markets. The analysis indicates that mucih  needs to be done in l'uture  rounds of
multilateral  trade  negotiations in  order to achieve more substantial  and real  reductions  in
agricultural  protection.  Overall,  while the  Round achiieved new  transparency  in  import
protection,  this  came  at  the expense of' significant  liheralizalion  in  most  products.  The
challenge for the tbture is to build on the groundwork which has been establishied  to acihieve
more serious liberalization in world trade.
54TABLE  7a.  COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-UR  TARIIf  EQUIVALENT
Pre  - UTR  Tariff Equivalent  Post  -UR Tariff  Equivalent
Average  Base  Final  Final/
1982-93  1986-88  1989-93  Rate  Rate  Base
(1)  (2)  1(2)/(I)-11*10(1
BRAZIL
WHEAT  56%  98%  98%  45.00%  45.00%  0.00%
RICE  -30%  -29%  -29%  55.00%  55.00%  0.00%
COARSE  GRAINS  -15%  -2%  -2%  37.00%  35.00%  -5.41%
SUGAR  55.00%  35.00%  -36.36%
MEAT  -40%  -52%  -52%  25.00%  25.00%  o.00%
OTHER  MEAT  -33%  -42%  -42%  45.00%  35.00%  -22.22%
COFFEE  -10%  -10%  -10%  60.00%  35.00%  -41.67%
COCOA  -17%  -17%  -17%  70.00%  35.00%  -50.00%
TEA  81.25%  35.00%  -56.92%
OILSEEDS  -26%  -23%  -23%  86.10%  35.00%  -59.35%
MILK  -21%  -21%  -21%  53.06%  45.#6%  -13.56%
FRUITS  & VEGETABLES  50_.0%  32.80%  -35.44%
WOOL  20.00%  18.00%  -10.00%
COTTON  -21%  -21%  -21%  55.00%  55.00%  (.00%
OT1ER NON FOOD  _____  20.00%  1h.00_%  -10.00%
MEXICO
WHEAT  27%  -1%  55%  74.00%  67.00%  -9.46%
RICE  8%  7%  7%  50.00%  45.00%  -10.00%
COARSE  GRAINS  68%  73%  69%  174.40%  157.33%  -9.79%
SlJGAR  -42%  -58%  -1(1%  173.00%  156.00%  -9.83%
MEAT  39%  42%  35%  50.00%  45.00%  -10.00%
OTHER  MEAT  _  _  _  217.67%  196.00%  -9.95%
COFFT-ETJ-  65.00%  54.00%  -16.92%
COCOA  _  _  _  50.00%  37.00%  -26.00%
TEA  50.00%  25.00%  -50.00%
O1L,EsEDS*  34%  -45%  41%  43.95%  39.41%  -10.32%
MILK  -4%  -3%  -6%  66.38%  53.85%  -I#.87%
FRUITS& VEGETABLES  7%  3%  13%  50.00%  36.00%  -28.00%
WOOL  nI  na  na  30.00%  23.0(0%  -23.33%
CO`'FON  17%  25%  2%  50.00%  45.00%  -10.00%
OTI IER  NON  rOOD  _  - 50.00%  45.00%  -10.00%
OTHER LATIN AMERICA
W1 EAT  -25%  -17%  -26%  34.25%  34.15%  -0.29%
RICE  161.16%  145.80%  -9.53%
COARSE  GRAINS  _  _  _  43.79%  35.41%  -19.15%
SIUGAR  35%  41%  23%  84.K2%  80.17%  -5.48%
MEA-r  51.15%  46.87%  -8.36%
OTIER  MEAT  _  _  _  85.09%  78.05%  -8.27%
cOFFEE  _  93.51%  66.36%  -29.03%
COCOA  86.46%  62.80%  -27.36%
TE A  35.00%  35.00%  0.00%
OILSEEDS  -27%  -20%  -29%  46.62%  44.99%  -3.48%
MILK  _  _  _  75.16%  69.31%  -7.78%
FRUITS  & VEGETABLES  4  _  46.86%  41.66%  -11.09%
WoOL_  34.54%  34.23%  -0.88%
Co(TrON  _  _  - 60.16%  5.5.93%  -7.02%
(TrIEuR  NON FOOD  50.85%  42.83%  -15.77%
_ Not available
Source: Author's  calculations:  basic  data are from  Uruguay  Round country schedules.
55TABLE  7b.  COMPARISON  OF  PRE- AND  POST-UR  TARIFF  EQUIVALENT
I're  - I IRTI  ariff Lqouivalent  IPot - Il  n  Tariff  Equivalent
Average  13F  l inal  Fiisl/
19#292  198-X()  (2)  1(2)/(1 )- 11  * I (
NIGERIA
WIIEAT  19(3%  249%  1821  ..  15(3.00%  (0.((0
RICE  137%  75%  3 %  150.(3(%  (3.00%
COARSE  GRAINS  452%.  250%  192%  150.00%  0.00%
SUGAR  29%  32%  5(3%  150.00%  0.00%
NMEAT  __  15(3  (3%  ((.0(%
OTHER  MEAT  _  150.0(n  %  f3.0(3%
COFFEE  _  _50n.3(,30,  33.3333%
COCOA  -2%,  15%  2%  ..  350.333,  (3.0(3%
TEA  ___  ..  1533.3(3%  0.((%
OILSEEDS*  _5  __I0.33(%  33.330%
MILK  _,  I 53(3j0%  (3.t)(l%
FRUITS  & VEGETABLES  ..  1533.3(3%  (3.0(3YO
WOOL  __  1533.3(33%  (3  (.(3%
COTFON  12%.  I%)  -37%  15(0.333%.  33.033%
OTIHER NON  FOOD  na  Da  '(a  .5(3(3(3%  (na(.(3%
NIEDITERRANEAN
WHEAT  12%;  25%  3 1r;  368.65%r  15 1.87%  -9.95%
RICE  43,  -54%  35%  31.48%  21.X5'.;  -303.59%,
COARSE  GRAINS  135  %l  25%  27%  133(.34%Z  117.440  -9.9(3%
SUGAR  (33  .133%  l10  10(6.52%  93.33.S  - 12.3x%
M,vEAT  165.52%i  149.14%  -9.9(3%
OTI  [ER MEAT  75.52%i  61.64%,  -38.3K%
COFFEE  6_._0cl,(  37.5(1%  -37.503%
COCOA  55.63%,  38.23%/,s  -33.2X8
TEA  23(3.333/,3  I  383.(3%i  - (3.3333%
OILSEEDS  29.15,  25.54%  -12.3X%
MILK  _166333%;  149.04g  -9.87%,
FRI  ITS  & VEGETABLES  39.2h%  3(1.i2X  -23.33%
WOOL.  19.631  %  7.XX',  -59.(
COfTTON  -7'.  l  -1  2%  333.3()  3i5  5.65 §  -43.531  r
(OTIlER NON FOOD  49.92r  44.92%..  - 333.(2
OTHF'R  AFRICA
WilEAT  -3%  3(3%  -ig  132.X8%  (3(3%.
RICIE  2°  3xr;%  I  1  ..  161.(6%i  33.3(3%
COARSE  GRAINS  -351i  4%  -15%°.4  132.72.S  n0.033%;
St  EG  AR  If;  44%  I7(3(3(3%  (3(3%
MVI'_N  .,  13.(3%  333(3%
OTIER MEA.M.A3'  _  _  _  ;(3(3t6  0.(33%
COFEE  4%  -16%CS  -2%.  333(3.33  (3.(3%
COCOA  -24r  -24%f.  -24%;  .1  0(2.11333%  ((.3(
TEA  3%  5%  -213  ..  33(33.3(33%  333(3%
OILSEEDS  -19%  27%  -19%  ..  78(33(3%  (33(3%
MILK  _  _(333.3(3%  3.3(33
FRIJITS  & VEGETABLES  ..  3(333.3(33%  ((.i3333
WOol,  I  .3(3.3333%  (3.3(33%
COTTON  -2'-  -33*  -26f  S  I((.3  6  333(3
OTlfER  NON FO)OD)  _3._3(0/  (3(33%
-Not  availahlc;..no lariff hindings fIr the pericKI  in (lIesticon.
Mediterranean  inciudeq Cypry  s, Egyp,  Israel. J(rdan,  LeIa0)On,  libya,  Malla,  Syria,  and  ITlMky.
Source: Author's  calculationLs; hasic data  are  Iromii  Uruguay  Round  country schedules.
56TABLE 7c.  COMPARISON OF PRE- AND POST-UR TARIFF  EQUIVALENT
Pre -UR Tariff Equivalent  Pomt  - UR Tariff  Equivalent
Averdgc  3lase  Flinal  Final/
19#2-92  19K6-.8  19#9-92  (1)  (2)  1(2)/(1)-1110
SOUTH AFRICA
WHEAT  7%  10%  -21%  74.50%  47.00%  -36.91%
RICE  _  _  |  5.00%  0.00%  -100.00%
COARSE GRAINS  24%  48%  1  %  68.00%  50.00%  -26.47%
SUGAR  50%  98%  -31%  124.00%  105.00%  -15.32%
MEAT  40%  40%  40%  150.00%  80.50%  -46.33%
OTHER MEAT  20%  20%  20%  93.32%  57.49%  -38.39%
COFFEE  - - - 140.00%  119.00%  -15.nO%
COCOA  _  _  _  2.50%  0.00%  -100.(0%
TEA  30%  30%  30%  200.00%  170.00%  -15.00%
OILSEEDS  20%  20%  20%  116.59%  66.43%  -43.02%
MILK  30%  30%  30%  189.46%  8K.94%  -53.06%
FRUITS & VEGETABLES  _  _  _  7.40%  5.8  1%  -21.46%
WOOL  30%  30%  30%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
COTTON  30%  30%  31U%  100.00%  60.00%  -40..00%
OTHLR NON FOOD  - - - 69.00%  44.00%  -36.23%
MAGHREB
WIIEAT  32%  36%  34%  195.85%  150.75%  -23.03%
RICE  _  _  _  233.50%  177.00%  -24.20%
COARSEGRAINS  17%  19%  13%  141.93%  10h.79%  -23.35%
SUGAR  41%  64%  79%  219.54%  164.80%  -24.93%
MEAT  _  _  _  302.77%  212.86%  -29.70%
OTIER  MEAT  _  _  _  124.40%  94.52%  -24.02%
COFFEE  _  _  _  72.50%  54.50%  -24.83%
COCOA  _  _  _  103.81%  69.72%  -32.84%
TEA  _  _  _  72.50%  54.50%  -24.83%
OILSEEDS  45%  45%  45%  129.21%  97.54%  -24.51%
MILK  50%  50%  50%  112.85%  87.10%  -22.82%
-lUITS  & VEGETABLES  - - - 91.42%  69.01%  -24.51%
WO(Ol.  _  45.75%  33.00%  -27.88%
CYll1'ON  Ifl2';  166%.'  104%  27.22%  20.47:4  .24.80%
()1  IIER  NON Ft)O[)  _  _  70.69%  53.15%  -24.81%
Not available
Maglircb  includes  Algeria, Morocco.  and Tunisia.
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